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I. INTRODUCTION

During the past half-century, education experienced a rapid
Where no rights
and broad expansion of student rights.'
previously existed, students now have the right to be free from
discrimination based on race, 2 language status,3 disability,4
wealth,5 gender, 6 and homelessness. 7 But the full development of
these rights, along with substantive educational improvements for
disadvantaged students, stalled more recently. For instance,
mandatory school desegregation, which laid the political and
theoretical foundations for the other movements, is nearly
nonexistent today.8
School finance litigation experienced
See generally Betsy Levin, The Courts, Congress, and Educational Adequacy: The
Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REV. 187, 205-24 (1979) (describing the creation
and expansion of student rights in the areas of race, gender, disability, language status, and
poverty); Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, CharterSchools, and Lessons to be Learned, 64 FLA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.works.bepress.com/Derekblack/6/
(describing the expansion of equal opportunities for students).
2 See, e.g., Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) ("No
State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
race .. . ."); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241,
252 (1964) ("No person .. . shall, on the ground of race, ... be excluded from ... any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 Stat. 1425,
1440 (2002) (covering "limited English proficient children").
See, e.g., The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400
(2006) (mandating that "all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education").
5 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (holding that education is a
fundamental interest and subjecting school financing systems based on wealth and
inequities to strict scrutiny).
6 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) ("No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in ... any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . .").
7 See, e.g., McKinney-Vento Homeless Education Assistance Improvements Act of 2001,
42 U.S.C. § 11431 (2006) ("Each State Educational agency shall ensure that each child of a
homeless individual and each homeless youth has equal access to the same free, appropriate
public education. . . .").
8 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1615-19 (2003) (describing how the
courts' cessation of remedies for desegregation caused resegregation to result); Wendy
Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1159-60 (2000)
[hereinafter Parker, School Desegregation] (arguing that although desegregation litigation
was not dead in 2000, most surviving cases suffered from severe neglect). But see Dennis D.
Parker, Are Reports of Brown's Demise Exaggerated?Perspectives of a School Desegregation
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sustained success for almost two decades but now shows signs of
Effective litigation and legislation on behalf of
faltering.9
language minorities and disabled students also stalled, as courts
and legislatures erected evidentiary barriers to reform.10 In some
respects, courts appear disappointed about the results of past
reform and are simply skeptical toward current claims.
For many, the practical limitations and shortcomings of
desegregation and other reforms may raise serious questions about
whether there is a promising future in rights-based education
reform and whether educational opportunities for disadvantaged

Litigator, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2005) (concluding that the era of civil rights
advances in the field of education is not dead).
9

John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes in FROM

SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY's ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 96, 96
(Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009); William S. Koski, Courthouses vs.
Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 923 (2011) (reviewing ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A.
LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDINGACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009) and MICHAEL A. REBELL,
COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE COURTS (2009)).
In just the past few months, however, some lower courts have shown a renewed willingness
to intervene in school finance or enforce existing orders. See, e.g., Lobato v. State, No.
2005CV4794 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://childrens-voices.orglwp-cont
ent/uploads/2011/12/Decision1.pdf ("Mhe Colorado public school finance system is not
rationally related to the mandate to establish and maintain a thorough and uniform system
of free public schools. On the contrary, the public school finance system is irrational,
arbitrary, and severely underfunded."); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 95 CVS 1158 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ncforum.org/doclibfManningOrder.pdf
(reiterating North Carolina's obligation to provide pre-kindergarten services to at-risk
students and refusing to modify prior orders). Of course, whether these courts are willing
and able to compel legislative action in their respective states in another question.
10 See

Kristi L. Bowman, PursuingEducational Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88

N.C. L. REV. 911, 929 (2010) ("During the 1960s and 1970s, Latinos/as began to benefit from
expanding educational equity rights via statutes, doctrine, and regulations. In the thirty
years since, many progressive social changes have occurred, but in general the rights-based
framework provided by law has contracted."); Eric Haas, The Equal Educational

Opportunity Act 30 Years Later: Time to Revisit "AppropriateAction" for Assisting English
Language Learners, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 361, 369 (2005) ("[T]he courts placed a burden of proof
upon the plaintiffs that is virtually impossible to meet. It appears that the courts will
uphold a school district's language support program for ELLs so long as the defendant

school district can find one 'expert' who will testify that the program's underlying theory
supports a 'successful' program somewhere in the world." (emphasis in original)); Mark C.
Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 102, 105 (2009) ("Some of the

current problems with special education eligibility stem from judicial decisions that read
the eligibility provisions extremely narrowly," including reading restrictive state standards
into the federal definition of disability, without any "justification in the federal statute").
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From their
students can be systematically improved.11
perspective, education reform has, at best, permanently plateaued
and, at worst, begun what will become an increasingly steep
decline.12 A historical view of civil rights and education, however,
suggests that this view is incorrect. Instead, Brown v. Board of
Educationl3 and the half-century of education reform that followed
collectively represent not the whole story of educational and civil
rights but only one part of what can be conceptualized as a multiIn fact, Brown followed at least two important
act play.
foundational periods: Reconstruction and Jim Crow.14 Each period
was a reaction to the events that preceded it, and while each
involved its own climatic movements, those moments did not
resolve the struggle for full educational opportunity.15 If history
serves as any guide, the modern era of educational civil rights and
reform will be no different, but rather, it will be part of both an
unending and uneven march forward that will be followed by a
new era.' 6
11See, e.g., Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but
Equal to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 53 (2007)

(arguing that the distinction between Plessy v. Ferguson's enforced segregation and today's
voluntary segregation "will not make a practical difference to our students ... as our
separate schools will continue to produce disparate educational opportunities for our poor
and minority students" and concluding that school finance litigation, for instance, will not
counteract the disparity); Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The
Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education,59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 775-79
(2008) (outlining the difficulties of pursuing a guarantee of a federal right to education);
Denise C. Morgan, Introduction: Brown Is Dead? Long Live Brown!, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1029, 1033-39 (2005) (posing the question of the viability of Brown's future and discussing
other symposium authors' thoughts on the subject).
12 See Morgan, supra note 11, at 1033-39 (noting the varying degrees of optimism and
pessimism toward Brown).
13 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863-1877,

at xxiv-xxv (1988) (conceptualizing Reconstruction not as a period of total racism and
conservatism but as a period of evolution where blacks were "active agents" in a new social
order and "interracial democracy"); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM

CROW 5-9 (2d ed. 1966) (discussing the new "Jim Crow" phase in history "that began in
1877 [with] the withdrawal of federal troops from the South" and lasted into the middle of
the following century).
15See WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 3-9 (discussing how the phases of slavery, war,
Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights Movement lead into and reacted to one
another).
16 See Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 1012
(2008) ("Brown demonstrates that history both progresses and cycles.").
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Placing the entire weight and focus of educational and civil
rights success on Brown and its progeny cuts this story short. It
leads to the conclusion that Brown has failed to reform schools and
that recent events are harbingers of the story's end. A broader
view of educational civil rights suggests that we are in a
transitional stage between Brown and the next act in the longrunning play of educational and civil rights attainment. Because
so many foundational accomplishments occurred previously,
advocates in this next act should be in a position to vindicate the
hopes of years past.
Yet, the failure to situate educational rights in this broader
context can, itself, be a harbinger of the end that many have
already forecast. While our past has been a forward march, the
progress that accompanies it is neither inevitable nor
uncontested.' 7 To seize the opportunities that will follow in
education's saga, advocates must first conceive a meaningful
future. The failure to do so is the equivalent of abandoning the
fight in advance. Of course, accepting the possibility of continuing
education rights expansion is easy. Identifying the animating
theme and strategy of this expansion is another matter altogether.
Currently, it is far from clear that reformers are even thinking in
terms of a thematic or paradigmatic next era. Leading reform
agendas are either so marred in the past that they cannot
construct a viable future or they attempt to entirely divorce
themselves from the past and ignore the most important lessons
already learned. Moreover, these divergent policy agendas, at
times, work at cross purposes.' 8
The key to spurring a new era of educational rights expansion
will be striking a balance that fully acknowledges the past but
does not repeat it. Most importantly, history teaches us that there
is no reason to believe that children who attend segregated, or
unequal, schools will consistently obtain equal educational
17 PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 8 (1999) ("[Racial progress has not been either

inevitable or irreversible in America.").
is See generally ERICA FRANKENBERG, GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JIA WANG, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE
NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS (2010) (criticizing charter schools and revealing the rift

between charter advocates and civil rights advocates).
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opportunities. But history also teaches us that our past strategies
are insufficient to resolve the problems. Policies that ignore these
stubborn facts of history face a steep uphill battle. Unfortunately,
those on all sides of the issue seem to do exactly that.
Civil rights advocates too often cling to the symbolism of Brown
and reiterate antiquated arguments, seemingly ignoring that they
have lost a slow battle of attrition. Similarly, school finance
advocates continue to press boilerplate funding claims even though
the most aggressive and courageous court responses to these
claims have still failed to secure substantive and lasting resource
equity. Policy makers have moved in the opposite direction. Most
pay scant attention to the need to stem racial and poverty
isolation, and the rest forward policies that assume creative
pedagogy can offset gross inequity. Though misguided in practice,
the various motivations of these institutional players are not
necessarily ill-intentioned. The key may be simply to redirect
their motivations. For instance, if the fervor behind current
reforms such as charter schools could coalesce around policies that
account for segregation and inequality, a new era of educational
expansion would be within reach. But this coalescing will only
occur if integrative and equality policies also find ways to create
outlets for modern reforms' expectations of creativity and
educational renewal.
II. SITUATING THE RECENT RETRENCHMENT WITHIN A BROADER
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. THE RECENT RETRENCHMENT

During the middle of the twentieth century, civil rights
advocates secured a progressive series of victories before the
Supreme Court that precipitated the momentous decision in
Brown.'9 Following Brown, the Court issued another series of
decisions that placed an affirmative obligation of integration on
19 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The cases leading up to Brown include
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Boardof Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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public schools. 20 In the decades after Brown, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) won
every school desegregation and inequality case it brought to the
Supreme Court. 21 As a result of these and other efforts, the face of
American education changed. When Brown was decided in 1954,
less than 0.1% of African-American students attended integrated
schools in the South. 22 During the decade following Brown, very
little changed, but during the 1980s, more than 40% of AfricanAmerican students in the South attended integrated schools.23
More importantly, by breaking down racial barriers to opportunity
and reducing poverty isolation, African-American graduation and
college enrollment rates soared during this same period. 24 The
African-American high school dropout rate was cut in half, falling
from almost 30% to less than 15%, and African-Americans' college
enrollment nearly doubled, rising from around 18% to 30%.25
The past two decades, however, have appeared to roll back
many of these gains. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
20 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (holding "that a finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school
system . .. creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not
adventitious"); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("In
default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district
court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.");
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (stating that school authorities are
"clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch").
21 John E. Lee, Note, The Rise (and Fall?) of Race-Conscious Remedies and 'Benign"
Racial Discrimination in Public Education, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 153, 171 n.112 (1996).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), was the first case to limit a desegregation remedy.
Id. From 1936 to 1961, Thurgood Marshall argued thirty-two cases on behalf of the NAACP
before the Supreme Court and won twenty-nine, many of which were school desegregation
cases. Mark Tushnet, Lawyer Thurgood Marshall,44 STAN. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1992).
22

GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 50: KING'S

DREAM OR PLESSYs NIGHTMARE? 19 tbl.7 (2004), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.
edu/researchlk-12-educationlintegration-and-diversitybrown-at-50-king2Ol9s-dream-or-ple
ssy20l9s-nightmare/orfield-brown-50-2004.pdf.
23 Id.
24 KIM M. LLOYD, MARTA TIENDA & ANNA ZAJACOVA, TRENDS IN EDUCATIONAL
ACHIEVEMENT OF MINORITY STUDENTS SINCE BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 15 fig.15, 17

fig.17 (2001), availableat http://theop.princeton.edu/reports/misc/trendsin-ed.pdf.
25 Id. (providing high school dropout data from 1967 to 1999 and reporting college
enrollment rates from 1972 to 1999).
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Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that made securing
new desegregation orders and sustaining old orders increasingly
difficult. 26 First, the Court emphasized the need to return control
over educational decision making to local authorities. 27 This
premise dominated the entire evaluation of cases, rendering
continuing segregation and inequality irrelevant in various
instances. 28 Second, the Court treated the mere passage of time
and existence of demographic changes as presumptive evidence
warranting the dismissal of a desegregation decree. 29 Of course,
26 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (holding that an "order requiring
the State to continue to fund the quality education programs," which sought to reverse
white flight, was beyond the authority of the district court); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
496 (1992) (finding that a school district is under no duty to remedy an imbalance caused by
demographic factors in the absence of de jure discrimination); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (holding that the lower court's test for dissolving a desegregation
decree was more stringent than was required).
27 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 ("Dissolving a desegregation decree after the local authorities
have operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time properly recognizes that
'necessary concern for the important values of local control of public school systems dictates
that a federal court's regulatory control of such systems not extend beyond the time
required to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination.'" (quoting Spangler v.
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) ("[The federal courts
in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in
managing their own affairs . . . ").
28 See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489 ("[The court's end purpose must be to remedy the
violation and, in addition, to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school
system .... ); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 ('The legal justification for displacement of local
authority by an injunctive decree in a school desegregation case is a violation of the
Constitution by the local authorities."); see also Robert L. Carter, Public School
Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 885, 890-91 (1993)
(characterizing the Court's standards for dismissing desegregation orders as "lax"); Wendy
Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause Roberts Style, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 533
(2009) ("Another prominent value in the Rehnquist Court's Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence was the importance of local control in the education setting."); Mark V.
Tushnet, The 'We've Done Enough" Theory of School Desegregation, 39 How. L.J. 767, 779
(1996) (concluding that the Court and public gave up on desegregation rather than
addressing the facts and law).
29 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 475-77 (recounting the demographic shifts that caused a
predominantly white school district to become almost entirely minority). The Court's
holding in Freeman, moreover, is inapposite to the Court's indication in Keyes v. School
District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), that, while the passage of time blurred the connection to
past segregation, the passage of time alone was not controlling. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 21011 ("We reject any suggestion that remoteness in time has any relevance to the issue of
intent. If the actions of school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative
intent and the segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of
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both the passage of time and demographic changes naturally and
inevitably exist in most school districts.30 Thus, with these
holdings, segregation levels today have risen back to levels
resembling those that existed four decades ago, when
desegregation had finally begun in earnest.3 '
The federal government has even gone so far as to facilitate this
resegregation. 32 While the Department of Justice still maintains
an active docket of desegregation cases,33 it aggressively litigates
very few to expand integration. 34 In fact, during the Bush
Presidency, the Department of Justice consistently moved for
school districts to be declared unitary.35
As a result, the
Department's desegregation docket decreased nearly by half in
just a few short years, falling from 430 in 2000 to 266 in 2007.36
At best, courts permitted relatively meager orders to remain in
various other cases.37
To add insult to injury, the Supreme Court more recently placed
limits on the steps that districts can take to voluntarily
desegregate their schools. 38 In Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court treated the use
of race to integrate schools as functionally equivalent to the use of
remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions any less 'intentional.' ").
30 See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976) (describing the
pattern of human migration as "quite normal").
31 See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 22, at 18 (comparing 1970 segregation to 1999 levels).
32 See Danielle Holley-Walker, After Unitary Status: Examining Voluntary Integration
Strategies for Southern School Districts, 88 N.C. L. REV. 877, 887 (2010) (noting the
"integral role of the DOJ" in the "racially homogenous" unitary status cases).
3 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE? SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY STATUS 23 (2007)
(indicating that the United States was a party to 266 cases in 2007).
34 See Holley-Walker, supra note 32, at 889 (commenting that the George W. Bush
Presidency was marked by hostility to desegregation litigation).
35 See id. at 887-90 (describing the Department of Justice under the Bush
Administration as "active and hostile.. . to continuing Southern desegregation cases").
36 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 22.
3
See Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal
Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 759-60 (2010) ('To make matters worse, over the past
forty years, under no administration, Democratic or Republican, has DOJ taken a
thoughtful, transparent, comprehensive, and strategic approach to its school desegregation
docket, which apparently includes something in the neighborhood of 250 cases at present.").
38 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007)
(holding that voluntary desegregation plans relying on racial classification must meet strict
scrutiny and requiring school districts to narrowly tailor such plans).
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race to segregate them.39 Thus, the Court demanded that schools
justify their voluntary desegregation plans with a compelling
interest. 40 Only by the narrowest margin did the Court accept the
basic principle that preventing racial isolation and promoting
diversity were compelling interests. 41 Four justices would have
held that race-based desegregation is justified only as a remedy to
intentional racial segregation. 42 The Court's majority struck down
the desegregation plans before it, characterizing the districts'
plans as racial balancing43 and finding that the districts had failed
to show that other race-neutral means were not available to
achieve their ends. 44
The Department of Justice, Solicitor General, and Department
of Education also sided with the most extreme positions in the
case.45 The United States argued that strict scrutiny should apply
to the plans and that, consistent with the minority of four on the
Court, the districts lacked a compelling interest to voluntarily
desegregate because their purpose was not to remedy past
intentional discrimination. 46 It also would have applied the most
rigorous narrow tailoring to the plans, finding that they amounted
to quota systems, lacked. sufficient stopping points, unfairly
39 Id. at 747-48 ("Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not
carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again-even for
very different reasons. For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as
Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County,
the way 'to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial
basis,'. . . is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." (quoting Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955))).
40 Id. at 720.
41 Id. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 720 (plurality opinion).
4 See id. at 726 ("In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance,
pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.").
44 Id. at 735.
45 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 2415458, at *8 [hereinafter United States
ParentsInvolved Amicus Briefj (noting that this was a case of race balancing rather than an
attempt to "eliminate the lingering effects of any de jure segregation").
46 Compare id. at 10 ("[Tihe use of such race-based measures must be strictly limited to
remedying past discrimination."), with Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (finding that
"remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination" is a compelling interest).
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burdened third parties, and failed to implement race-neutral
plans.47
After the Court issued its decision, the Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights disregarded those portions of
the Court's opinion that were favorable to school districts and
treated its own more conservative position as controlling law. In
an official letter and statement of policy to school districts, the
Office for Civil Rights refused to even mention Justice Kennedy's
controlling opinion. 48 Thus, the letter incorrectly stated that the
Court has recognized that "a government interest is compelling
[for equal protection purposes in the school context] in only two
instances: to remedy the effects of intentional discrimination and
to obtain a diverse student body in higher education."49 One might
argue that the letter intentionally misled school district officials as
to the law by "strongly encourag[ing] the use of race-neutral
methods for assigning students to elementary and secondary
schools," when even Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion had
not done so. 50 The result of this letter was to discourage the
nation's public school educators from taking action that is, in fact,
constitutional and would enhance educational opportunities for all

4
United States Parents Involved Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 21-29, 2006 WL
2415458, at *21-29.
48 STEPHANIE J. MONROE, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE USE OF
RACE IN ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (2008)
(withdrawn). Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), established the prevailing legal

test for analyzing Supreme Court precedent in divided opinions. See Ruth L. Friedman,
Comment, The Confrontation Clause in Search of a Paradigm:Has Public Policy Trumped
the Constitution?, 22 PACE L. REV. 455, 466 n.53 (2002) (noting the traditional use of the

Marks "narrowest grounds" test to analyze the impact of plurality decisions). Under this
analysis, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved is controlling. See United
States v. Alamance-Burlington Bd. of Educ., 640 F. Supp. 2d 670, 683 (M.D.N.C. 2009)
(stating in dicta that Justice Kennedy's concurrence established that racial diversity is a
compelling interest in remedying de facto resegregation); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 536 F.
Supp. 2d 274, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying the Marks analysis and indicating that Justice
Kennedy's concurrence was the controlling holding of Parents Involved); James E. Ryan,
Comment, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 137
(2007) (explaining that Justice Kennedy's concurrence is controlling because he only
concurs in part of the plurality's opinion and the four dissenters "would apply looser criteria
to assess voluntary integration plans than would Justice Kennedy").
4 MONROE, supra note 48.
50 Id.

HeinOnline -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 567 2011-2012

568

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:557

students, particularly for poor students of color. 1 The Obama
Administration eventually rejected this position and issued a new
guidance on the Court's opinion, but waited until the end of 2011
to make this correction. 52
School finance, while fairing far better than desegregation,
recently showed signs of slowing and potentially reversing course.
During the late 1990s and the first several years of the new century,
multiple state supreme court decisions each year ordered their
respective legislatures to direct more financial resources toward
property-poor districts or districts serving disproportionately large
numbers of at-risk students.53 Prior to the end of 1990, only fifteen
high courts had ruled in favor of plaintiffs, but in the following five
years, an additional twelve high courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs. 54
In all, between 1990 and 2005, forty-three high courts ruled in favor
of plaintiffs.55 More recently, the victories have been far less
frequent and courts seem unwilling to even jump into the foray in
some instances. 56 For instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, a
long-time leader in school finance, rejected a challenge to the state's
51 See The Integration Report-The Civil Rights Project at UCLA-Issue 23, EDUCATION
NEWS (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.educationnews.org/ed reports/education organizations/2
9036.html (noting the actions taken by the Department of Education to discourage
integration).
52 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND
AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (2011), available at

http://www2.ed.gov/print/aboutloffices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html (last modified
Jan. 3, 2012).
53 See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, 'Meaningful"EducationalOpportunity,and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500-05 (2007) (discussing the results in state cases
and the substantive meaning of the constitutional right to education in those cases).
5

SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY app. at 345-

58 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) [hereinafter SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS]; see
also DAVID HURST ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW
AND INVENTORY OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 TO 2000, at 41-43 tbl.3.3 (2003)

(listing all plaintiff victories in school finance litigation by state), available at http://nces.ed.
gov/pubs2003/2003020.pdf.
r5 SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS, supra note 54, app. at 345-58.
6 See Dinan, supra note 9, at 96 ("Numerous state court rulings of the past several years
indicate, however, that the school finance litigation movement may have peaked, in that
many judges are now disinclined to undertake continuing supervision of school finance
policies."); Koski, supra note 9, at 924 ("Recently, however, a few courts seem to be taking a
more cautious approach, either declining to become embroiled in school-finance lawsuits or
declaring the school-finance systems constitutional and relinquishing jurisdiction.").
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finance system in 2009,57 the court's first such decision in a series of
twenty decisions stretching over thirty-six years.58 The court's
decision was limited and had relatively little precedential impact, 59
but other courts have taken stark steps. For instance, after issuing
a strong decision in favor of the plaintiffs in 1993 and establishing
the need for various reforms, 60 Massachusetts's highest court
refused to enforce the principles of that holding in 2005 and rejected
the plaintiffs' claim and the lower court's findings that the state was
providing inadequate funding to needy students.6 ' Ohio went
further, withdrawing jurisdiction from lower courts to hear school
finance claims in 2003,62 after having issued several orders for
school finance reforms in previous years. 63 Even the Supreme Court
of the United States, which has traditionally extricated itself from
all issues relating to school finance, has waded into school funding
issues to overturn a longstanding set of finance remedies for
In other less
Arizona's English Language Learners program."
Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992 (N.J. 2009).
See id. at 991 (noting the decision is twentieth in the line of cases). The first case was
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). But see Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20
A.3d 1018, 1045 (N.J. 2011) (ordering the state to fully fund the School Funding Reform Act
of 2008 for the Abbott districts).
69 See, e.g., Abbott, 20 A.3d at 1024-25 (finding state distribution of funds improper).
60 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552 (Mass. 1993) (finding
that the state was depriving many students in poor communities of an adequate education).
61 See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Mass. 2005) (sharing the
lower court's "concern that sharp disparities in the educational opportunities, and the
performance, of some Massachusetts public school students persist," but finding that "[tihe
public education system [the court] review[ed] was not the public education system
reviewed in McDuffy" and that "[i]ts shortcomings, while significant in the focus districts,
do not constitute the egregious, [s]tatewide abandonment of the constitutional duty
identified in that case.").
62 See State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 198, 202 (Ohio 2003) ('Therefore,
our . .. mandate forbids. .. the common pleas court to exercise further jurisdiction in this
matter .... The duty now lies with the General Assembly to remedy [the] educational
system .... .").
63 See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002) (directing "the General
Assembly to enact a school-funding scheme that is thorough and efficient"); DeRolph v.
State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1201 (Ohio 2001), vacated, 780 N.E.2d 529 (urging the legislature
to "consider alternative means of funding"); DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125, 288 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 1999) (finding the state had failed to overhaul Ohio's school funding system); DeRolph
v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (plurality opinion) ("Ohio's public school financing
scheme must undergo a complete systematic overhaul.").
64 See Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2588, 2597 (2009) (overruling the Arizona Court
of Appeals requirement for a state to show "a particular funding mechanism" as a
57

68
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dramatic instances, school finance may simply die of neglect. As of
April 2012, the South Carolina Supreme Court had not issued a
decision in a case that went to trial in 2005 and was argued before
the supreme court in 2008.65 Although not as blatantly (and not
before their state supreme courts), litigation in Georgia and Florida
has also languished or stalled. 66 Of course, plaintiffs are still
emerging with victories in some instances.67 But the overall trend
suggests that a retrenchment may be occurring-in part because of
a faltering economy.68 Cognizant of the serious financial reality and
the cutbacks they have made to education, some state legislatures
have acted to foreclose any possibility of school finance litigation,
enacting prohibitions against districts expending funds to support
litigation against the state. 69
misapprehension of the Equal Education Opportunities program). For prior decisions that
imposed funding obligations on the state, see Flores v. Arizona, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1164
(D. Ariz. 2007) (requiring the state to provide sufficient funding to implement the state's
chosen language instruction method), affid, 516 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, sub nom.
Horne v. Flores 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009); Flores v. State, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1118 (D. Ariz.
2005) (enjoining the administration of a graduation test until adequate funding for English
Language Learner programs is established), vacated sub nom. Flores v. Rzeslawski, 204 F.
App'x 580 (9th Cir. 2006); and Flores v. State, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1238-39 (D. Ariz. 2000)
(finding the state's allocation of $150 per student with limited English proficiency to be
inadequate).
65 Education Justice South Carolina, EDUC. LAW CTR., http://www.educationjustice.org/st
ates/southcarolina (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
66 New litigation was filed in Georgia in 2004 but withdrawn in 2008 after being
transferred to a judge perceived to be hostile to the case. The plaintiffs have not refiled it.
Education Justice Georgia, EDUC. LAW CTR., http://www.educationjustice.org/states/Georgia
(last visited Apr. 11, 2012). Multiple cases have been filed in Florida over the past several
years, some of which have been dismissed and none of which have reached the state
supreme court. FloridaLitigation, NATL ACCESS NETWORK, http://www.schoolfunding.info/
states/fl/litfl.php3 (last updated Aug. 2010).
67 See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 271
(Conn. 2010) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (allowing the plaintiff to proceed with a claim
brought under the state constitution for suitable education opportunity); Abbott ex rel.
Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1041 (N.J. 2011) (requiring the state to comply with a state
constitutional mandate to adequately fund school systems).
68 See Michael A. Rebell, Litigation Strategies for Hard Economic Times, NAT'L ACCESS
NETWORK, http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/12-2010Stateline.php3 (last visited
Dec. 14, 2011) ("[I]t would be naive not to recognize that some courts may be reluctant to
assume jurisdiction of new cases or to enforce vigorously existing decisions when faced with
arguments from state officials that severe revenue shortfalls and escalating entitlement
obligations make it difficult to maintain educational funding levels, no matter how
important they may be.").
69In March 2011, the New Hampshire House of Representatives passed, with a 252-to-
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Although not as obvious or thoroughly analyzed, other reform
movements on behalf of special education students, homeless
students, and students who speak English as a second language
For
have experienced analogous setbacks or limitations.o
instance, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974
obligates school districts "to take appropriate action to overcome
language barriers that impede equal participation by its students
in its instructional programs,"7 ' but courts have required plaintiffs
to establish that districts' programs are causing diminished
achievement or failing to elevate student achievement to the
appropriate level. 72 For a variety of practical reasons, this has
simply been impossible to show, regardless of an English
Language Learner (ELL) program's poor results or its
questionable pedagogical basis. 73 Similarly, federal law obligates
113 vote, a constitutional amendment intended to give the legislature full discretion on
school aid, effectively removing judicial branch influences over school finance decisions. See
Tom Fahey, Senate Panel OKs Amendment to Ease Targeting School Aid, NEW HAMPSHIRE
UNION LEADER, Mar. 23, 2011, available.at 2011 WLNR 5753258 (noting passage of the
amendment). The bill was subsequently approved by the senate, with a vote of 16-to-8. The
amendment is expected to be on the ballot in 2012, where voters must approve it by a twothirds vote. Editorial, No to Amendment on School Funding,TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.),
Apr. 19, 2011, availableat 2011 WLNR 7563936.
70 See generally Black, supra note 1. Gender equality is arguably an exception to the
general trend in that females consistently match or outperform males in elementary and
secondary reading skills and are now the majority of students at many universities. NAT'L
CTR. FOR EDUc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDION OF EDUCATION 2011 app.
at 182 tbl.A-11-1, app. at 172 tbl.A-8-2 (2011), availableat http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/201
1033.pdf; Tamar Lewin, At Colleges, Women Are Leaving Men in the Dust, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2006, at Al. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude gender inequity has been entirely
eliminated. Sex discrimination, for instance, is still a serious problem in public schools.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (recognizing a
course of action on behalf of girls' basketball coach who alleged retaliation for complaining
of unequal treatment of the girls' basketball team); Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632 (1999) (noting accusations of sexual harassment
against fifth grader); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1998)
(discussing a teacher's sexual harassment of students).
71 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006).
72 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that if the
program should fail "to produce results indicating that the language barriers confronting
students are actually being overcome" then "that program may. .. no longer constitute
appropriate action").
73 See, e.g., Quiroz v. State Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. S-97-1600WBS/GGH, 1997 WL 661163,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1997) ("Castaneda provides no guidance in determining what
standards a court should use in evaluating an educational plan. Because it 'is surely
beyond the competence of this court to fashion its own measure of academic achievement'
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states and districts to provide special services to homeless
students and initially provided hope for substantive improvements
in their education outcomes. 74 Yet, over time, students' legal
rights have languished as neither courts nor federal agencies have
enforced the right in any serious way. 75
B. RETRENCHMENT AS ONE PART OF LARGER CYCLES

The retrenchment in school desegregation, the potential
beginning of the same in school finance, and the serious
limitations of other movements naturally leave many to wonder
whether educational civil rights have peaked and offer any
prospect for meaningful reform in the future. As compared to the
second half of the twentieth century, the possibility for vindication
of educational civil rights today appears meager. This comparison,
however, is not the appropriate one and lends itself to an overly
pessimistic and self-defeating approach. To look to the future of
educational civil rights with any level of clarity, we must look
further back than the near past. No doubt, the recent erosion or
faltering of rights has been painful and real for communities,76 but
a longer historical approach to educational civil rights suggests
that rather than being on a terminal dead-end slide, educational
rights and reform are simply in a transitional stage.
Unfortunately, this transition entails a realignment of rights and
But from a
remedies that includes temporary regression.
historical perspective, this transitional, regressionary period is not
new or unexpected. Moreover, the realignment of rights and
the court approaches this prong with 'great trepidation.'" (quoting Teresa P. ex rel. T.P. v.
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1989)).
74 McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11431 (2006).
75 See Jennifer A. Na, Comment, For Better or For Worse?: A Closer Look at the Federal
Government's Proposal to Provide Adequate Educational Opportunities for Homeless
Children, 51 How. L.J. 863, 885-88 (2008) (detailing the careless federal monitoring of the
Education for Homeless Children and Youth program).
76 The experience of Charlotte, North Carolina, during desegregation shows the positive
effects of desegregation, which are contrasted with resegregation and its academic
consequences. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation
and Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-MecklenburgSchools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513,
1546-48, 1556-59 (2003) (discussing the positive academic outcomes in Charlotte while
under court order to desegregate and projecting the results of the decision to terminate that
order).
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remedies can set the stage for another period of educational
opportunity expansion.
The movement toward full recognition and vindication of
educational civil rights can be best understood as a multi-act play
with rising and falling action in each act. The natural inclination
of current generations is to understand and analyze their
circumstances primarily from their own narrow vantage point.
But this vantage point captures, at best, a single act in the play.
As C. Vann Woodward warned in his seminal text, The Strange
Career of Jim Crow, "[t]he twilight zone that lies between living
memory and written history is one of the favorite breeding places
of mythology."77
The saga of educational civil rights began well over a century
ago during post-Civil War Reconstruction. The educational rights
and opportunities during this period were a direct response to the
total absence of educational opportunity that followed from the
pre-war legal prohibition against African-Americans even learning
Three major legal
to read-much less attend schools.78
developments during Reconstruction drastically expanded the
educational opportunities of African-Americans (as well as many
poor whites): the creation of the Freedmen's Bureau and the
enactments of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution.
Bureau was tasked with several
The Freedmen's
As
responsibilities-education being among the foremost.7 9
General Oliver Howard, the Bureau's Commissioner, indicated:
"[T]he most urgent want of the freedmen was a practical
education; and from the first [he had] devoted more attention to
this than to any other branch of [his] work."80 The Bureau's
expenditures were a testament to this fact, with more than twothirds of its total budget spent on education during most years of
its existence.81 Under Howard's leadership, the Freedmen's
WOODWARD, supra note 14, at xii.
7 See FONER, supra note 14, at 96 ("[Elvery Southern state except Tennessee had
prohibited the instruction of slaves.").
79 See id. at 69, 144 (noting the Bureau's responsibilities and that "[e]ducation probably
represented the agency's greatest success in the postwar South").
so 2 OLIVER OTIs HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 368 (1907).
81 Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
77
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Bureau created Freedmen's schools and chartered universities. 82
It also assisted states in creating and funding a more universal
system of public education. 3 During its height, the Bureau itself
was educating approximately 100,000 students.84 It also provided
the funds necessary to establish several independent institutions
of higher education, most notably Howard University.85
The expansion of educational rights and opportunities was so
paradigmatic and the federal government's role so central that,
unlike other aspects of the Freedmen's Bureau, this work did not
simply come to an end with the natural expiration of the Bureau.
Rather, a federal Department of Education was created in 1867
and initially worked concurrently with the Bureau.86 Its purpose
was to "stimulate recognition of education as a national concern
beyond the moral duty owed to the new freedmen"87 and "to
enforce education, without regard to race or color, upon the
population of all such States as shall fall below a standard to be
Moreover, this purpose was not
established by Congress." 8
conceived as a mere policy initiative, but rather came from the
notion that

Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 780-81 (1985).
82 Id. at 781.
83 See FONER, supra note 14, at 144 (indicating that the Bureau helped 'lay the
foundation for Southern public education").
84 Schnapper, supra note 81, at 781.
8 HOWARD, supra note 80, at 394-95 (indicating that institutions of higher education
were started in Hampton, Charleston, Atlanta, Macon, Savannah, Memphis, Louisville,
Mobile, Talladega, Nashville, New Orleans, and other locations between 1866 and 1867 and
that as Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, General Howard, encouraged these
institutions and "adhere[d] to [his] principle of Government aid in dealing with [them]"); id.
at 395-401 (recounting the details of the founding of Howard University); see also JOHN

HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 308 (3d ed.

1969) ("Among the schools founded in this period which received aid from the Bureau were
Howard University, Hampton Institute, St. Augustine's College, Atlanta University, Fisk
University, Storer College, and Biddle Memorial Institute (now John C. Smith
University).").
86 Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 372
(2006).
87 Id. at 372-73.
88 Id.

at 373 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG.,

1ST SESS. 60 (1865) (resolution

introduced by Rep. Donnelly)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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every child of this land is, by natural right, entitled to
an education at the hands of somebody, and ... this
ought not to be left to the caprice of individuals or of
States so far as [Congress has] any power to regulate
it. At least, every child in the land should receive a
sufficient education to qualify him to discharge all the
duties that may devolve upon him as an American
citizen.89
Congress never gave the Department the power sufficient to
achieve these grand ends. But the Department's work certainly
facilitated the conversation and gradual movement toward those
ends, 90 which at the time was momentous.
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments' express language9 '
did not exert direct influence on educational rights in the way the
Freedman's Bureau did, but the Amendments produced two
significant indirect changes. First, Congress conditioned Southern
states' readmission to the Union not only on adopting the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments but also on making certain
changes to their own state constitutions, 92 including some aspects
of those clauses related to education. The result was an entire
reshaping of the legal framework regarding education at the state
level. For instance, prior to the war, Louisiana's constitution
explicitly apportioned education funds based only on "the number
of free white children" 93 and the Virginia constitution included no
provision for education at all. 94 Overall, during the antebellum
period, only a single state, Wisconsin, enacted a constitutional
89 Id. at 373-74 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 3045 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Moulton)).
90 See id. at 374 (describing the continued effect of the Bureau's work despite the
Bureau's demotion to an office within the Department of the Interior).
91 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
92 See, e.g., ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 90 (2009)
("A central feature of Radical Reconstruction was to require ... the southern states to
revise their constitutions ... as a condition of readmission to the Union."); John C.
Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State Constitutional
Provisions for Education 1776-1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 26-27 (1998) (describing
various developments in Confederate state constitutions following the Civil War).
93 LA. CONST. of 1852, tit. VIII, art. 136.
94 Eastman, supra note 92, at 13.
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provision that mandated the education of all children in the
state. 95 But, with the exception of Virginia, every state seeking
readmission to the Union adopted constitutional language during
the post-war period that required their legislature "to establish
and maintain a uniform or thorough system of free schools, for the
gratuitous instruction of all children in the State." 96
Second, by extending citizenship and the right to vote to
African-Americans, 97 the Amendments gave African-Americans
the opportunity to exert political power during Reconstruction,
which would prove important for education during the ensuing
years. African-Americans made a concerted effort to use their own
newfound political power and the progressive educational
mandates in the amended state constitutions to expand public
education further than ever before. As Professor Eric Foner
writes: "[B]1acks embraced the activist, reforming state as a
counterbalance to the forces of wealth and tradition arrayed
against them. 'They took to legislation ... because in the very
nature of things, they can look nowhere else.' "8 In particular,
they "supported appropriations for schools." 99
Neither standardized nor universal public education was
available prior to or during Reconstruction, but with these and
other efforts, it moved steadily in that direction and state
responsibility for education became commonplace. 100 In effect, the
Freedmen's Bureau and the changes the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments wrought ultimately coalesced to produce what one
might call an educational renaissance in the South. 0 1 Changes in
African-American literacy may be the greatest testament. In
1870, 20% of African-Americans were literate, but within three
decades, more than half were. 102

95 Id. at 17.

96 Id. at 27.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
FONER, supra note 14, at 365 (quoting an Alabama newspaper).
9 Id.
1oo See id. at 366 (describing the rise of public schools in the Reconstruction South).
101See generally Marjorie H. Parker, Some Educational Activities of the Freedmen's
9

98

Bureau, 23 J. NEGRO EDUC. 9 (1954).
102 NAVL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 9 (1993).
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The great promise of Reconstruction, however, was ultimately
cut short by the political compromise of 1877, in which the
Republican nominee for President, Rutherford B. Hayes, agreed to
withdraw federal troops from the South in exchange for an end to
a dispute over election results. 03 With no protection from violence
or enforcement of newfound rights, the rise of Jim Crow ensued.104
As Reconstruction ended, so did education's first act, which was
overwhelmingly comprised of progressively expanding educational
opportunities. But rather than continued unfettered expansion,
the first act immediately led into a second act characterized by
segregation and discrimination, which the Supreme Court
infamously constitutionalized in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson.05
Those educational institutions that had not already adopted the
so-called "separate but equal" principle quickly followed suit.
From the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, AfricanAmericans were consistently denied opportunities altogether at
the higher education level and offered only segregated
opportunities at the elementary and secondary level. 0 6 Moreover,
segregated education was separate but equal in name alone. In
reality, school districts devoted far more resources to the education
of whites than African-Americans. For example, "[i]n 1915, the
average amount spent in [thirteen] Southern States for basic
education of a black student was $4.01 compared with $10.82 for a
1os See FONER, supra note 14, at 575-81 (describing the electoral crisis and compromise of
1877); WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 6 (characterizing the withdrawal of federal troops from
the South as "the abandonment of the Negro as a ward of the nation").
104 See FONER, supra note 14, at 593-96 (detailing laws in the post-war South meant to
restore white supremacy). But see id. at 587 (noting the end of Reconstruction did not
immediately end progress).
105 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) ("[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even
requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does
not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.").
106 See To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 63-65 (1947) (detailing discrimination and education disparities during the mid1940s); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BRowN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 256-57 (1975) (discussing the
unequal funding of elementary and secondary education for blacks in the South and that, as
of 1947, there was nothing even approaching a first-class university opportunity for blacks
in segregated states and not a single southern institution where blacks could pursue a
doctorate).
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white student." 0 In many districts, the disparity was much worse
and remained so over time. 08 For instance, in the 1949-1950
school year, Clarendon County, South Carolina, spent $179 per
white pupil and $43 per black pupil.109 The district even denied
African-Americans bus transportation altogether while offering it
to whites."10 And at one point, the U.S. Supreme Court went so far
as to sanction the closing of African-American schools while the
white school remained open in Richmond County, Georgia, because
the district claimed it could not afford both."
As brutally unjust as Jim Crow was, the period did not cede all
the gains that had preceded it, nor did it fail to carve out certain
bases for later progress. Viewed in isolation, the Jim Crow era is
easily cast as an educational dark age. But from a broader
historical perspective, two significant positive points arise.
First, while educational opportunities for minorities do not
continue unabated from the first act into the second act,
educational opportunities for minorities do not retreat back toward
pre-war circumstances. In fact, educational opportunities-albeit
segregated and unequal-continued to grow in some instances for
African-Americans. At the highest level, historical black colleges
and universities grew in number and enrollment. In the first
federal survey of black colleges in 1915, thirty institutions serving
107 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE TRADITIONALLY BLACK
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION: 1860 TO 1982, at 2 (1985). Richard Kluger indicated

that "[i]n 1910, eleven Southern states spent an average of $9.45 on each white child
enrolled in their public schools and $2.90 on each black child" and that by 1916 the
disparity grew with spending on whites rising to $10.32 per child while dropping to $2.89
for blacks. KLUGER, supra note 106, at 88.
1o8 See, e.g., Kamina A. Pinder & Evan R. Hanson, De Jure,De Facto, & Dej& Vu All Over
Again: A HistoricalPerspective of Georgia's Segregation-EraSchool Equalization Program,
3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 165, 175 (2010) (discussing funding during segregation in Atlanta,
Georgia, and noting that "[t]he per capita expenditure for black schools was $1.71 compared
to $15 for white schools.").
10 KLUGER, supranote 106, at 8.
110 See id. at 13-21 (providing a narrative of the litigation over discriminatory bus service
for students). It was not until the 1940s that African-American students in the Summerton
community of Clarendon County went to a school with electricity and running water.
PETER IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION 45-46
(2002). White students at the time already had a cafeteria and science lab. Id. at 46.
" Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 530, 545 (1899) (refusing to
intervene when Richmond County closed the high school for blacks but kept open the school
for whites).
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943 students were identified as offering college-level courses." 2
Another survey in 1927 showed that the number of black colleges
had risen to seventy-seven and the number of students to almost
14,000.113 By 1953, the number of undergraduate students
enrolled in black colleges grew to 75,000, with an additional 3,200
graduate students.114 Similarly, the number of African-Americans
enrolled in public high schools was just below 10,000 in 1906 but
grew to almost 100,000 in just two decades. 1' 5 On the basic
measure of educational attainment, literacy, African-Americans
likewise continued to make gains during each of the first four
decades of the twentieth century, with African-American illiteracy
rates falling from 44.5% in 1900 to 11.5% in 1940.116 While
segregation degraded and brutalized minorities in many respects,
these numbers further suggest that the period is part of a larger
African-American
continuum of rising and falling action.
opportunities were grossly unequal to those of whites, but the
extension of basic educational rights and policies during
Reconstruction had created a foundation upon which AfricanAmericans continued to build throughout the Jim Crow era. In
short, previously earned gains were readjusted and realigned but
not vanquished.
Second, the Jim Cow era included positive steps that set up the
dramatic expansion that occurred in the third act. During the
second half of the Jim Crow era, the NAACP pursued a litigation
strategy that accepted the principle of separate but equal and
sought to enforce it for the maximum benefit of minorities." 7
112

NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 107, at 5 tbl.1.3.

113 Id. at 7 tbl.1.4.
114 Id. at xiii.
colleges. Id.

Another 44,000 summer school students took courses at these black

115 Id. at 7 fig.1.1.
116 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supranote 102, at 21 tbl.6.
1' See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 638-39 (1950)
(discussing an African-American graduate student's contention that the school's denial of
his admission due solely to his race "deprived him of the equal protection of the laws");
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635--36 (1950) (holding that a separate law school for
minorities should afford equal educational opportunities as those that admit whites); Sipuel
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (stating that the black
"petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution [to white
applicants] in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment");
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (holding that "the State was
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While segregated schools were constitutional, the NAACP argued
unequal schools and opportunities were not. The NAACP further
used this principle to establish that the absence of opportunity was
also unconstitutional. 118 Thus, if a state did not offer AfricanAmericans segregated higher education opportunities within the
state, the only remaining remedy was for the state to admit
African-Americans to white schools.119 Later, the NAACP argued
that under some circumstances even segregated education would
be insufficient.12 0 For instance, separate could not be equal when
the opportunities available at a state's flagship law school are so
unique and integral to the subsequent practice of law in the state
that they cannot be replicated in an African-American-only
school.121 All of these arguments were ultimately successful before
the Supreme Court and expanded African-Americans' educational
opportunities, but left the principle of separate but equal intact.
III. THE MODERN ERA: THE SYSTEMATIC EXPANSION OF
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS

The rising action during the latter half of education's second act
laid the foundation for the third act, or the modern era, which
began with Brown. Few, if any, other legal decisions rival the
drama and significance of Brown. By declaring that separate was
inherently unequal, the Court rendered unconstitutional what had
been the dominant paradigm of American education for more than

bound to furnish [for an African-American law student] within its borders facilities for legal
education substantially equal to those" afforded to whites).
18 Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349-50 (finding unconstitutional the practice of operating a whiteonly law school within the state and sending African-Americans out of state for legal
education opportunities).
11 See id. at 351 (binding a state to furnish within its borders facilities to provide equal
education to all)
120 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34 (describing the disproportionate opportunities available
to students at the University of Texas School of Law compared to the Texas State
University for Negroes).
121 See id. at 634 ("[The University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree
those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness
in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the
community, traditions and prestige.").
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a half-century. This momentous decision opened the door to an
avalanche of litigation, structural reform, and rights expansion. 22
Admittedly, school desegregation did not immediately come to
fruition during the decade following Brown, as schools refused to
act on their own volition.123 But with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964124 and aggressive Supreme Court decisions
shortly thereafter, school desegregation took off.125 The Court held
that the Constitution imposed affirmative obligations on schools to
eliminate the vestiges of segregation "root and branch,"126 which
necessitated aggressive steps such as busing and redrawing
The Court also indicated that racial
attendance zones.1 27
imbalances in various aspects of education beyond just student
assignments were constitutionally suspect.128 By prohibiting
discrimination in federally funded programs129 and expanding its
funding of public education, the Civil Rights Act also created fiscal

122 See MARTHA MINOW, IN BROwNs WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA'S EDUCATIONAL
LANDMARK 1-4 (2010) (drawing connections between Brown and the expansion of other

rights and movements).
123 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1958) (noting the resistance of public
officials from Arkansas to desegregate); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR.,
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 513 (8th ed. 2000)
(describing the resistance of White Citizens' Councils to desegregation).
124

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.

125

See GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS

AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1-5, 15, 22-23 (1969) (discussing the shift toward serious
efforts to desegregate schools).
126 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (finding that school authorities
were "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch.").
127 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1971) ("The
remedy for [past] segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even
bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and
inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are
being made to eliminate the dual school systems.").
128 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196, 213-14 (1973) (identifying factors
beyond student assignments as points of inquiry and applying a presumption to racial
imbalances in student assignment); Green, 391 U.S. at 435 (identifying imbalances in staff,
faculty, transportation, student assignment, extracurricular activities, and facilities as
ways in which schools are racially identifiable).
129

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d (2006) (prohibiting recipients of federal financial aid from

discriminating on the grounds of race, color, or national origin).
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incentives for integration and disincentives for segregation.130 In
effect, Congress dangled the carrot and the Court held the stick. .
The impacts of Brown, its progeny, and the Civil Rights Act
were also significant in expanding equality to issues beyond race.
The concept of equal educational opportunity naturally extended
to other disadvantaged groups beyond racial minorities. 13 1 And
once the concept gained traction in regard to race, analogous
movements followed in other educational paradigms.132 The
federal courts themselves recognized that the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection prohibited gender and disability
discrimination in education in addition to race 33 and that
statutory prohibitions against racial discrimination also extended
to ethnicity and language barriers that can accompany race.134
Congress also passed significant legislation to further equality of
educational opportunity for poor students in 1965,135 women in

130

See ORFIELD, supra note 125, at 24-25, 47, 76-77 (discussing agencies' use of funding

as leverage to enforce the Civil Rights Act).
131 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 122, at 5-6 ("Although Brown focused on racial equality, it
also inspired social movements to pursue equal schooling beyond racial differences, and it
yielded successful legal and policy changes addressing the treatment of students' language,
gender, disability, immigration status, socioeconomic status, religion, and sexual
orientation."); Elizabeth Davenport, Brown and GenderDiscrimination,in BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION: ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION 77, 77 (Dara N. Byrne ed., 2005) ("Brown
and its progeny became the mechanism by which women could work to change sexual
misconceptions and achieve equal rights. Brown opened the discussion for inequalities
experienced by female students."); John Dayton, Commentary, Special Education Discipline
Law, 163 EDUC. L. REP. 17, 17 n.5 (2002) (noting the expansion of credit to Civil Rights Act
for civil rights victories of disabled students).
132 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 1, at 206, 209, 212 (describing how Brown's concepts of
equality were extended to or argued in other paradigms).
133 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (finding that
equal protection prohibits excluding men from a nursing school based on gender); Mills v.
Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that denying disabled students
publicly supported education violates equal protection and due process); Pa. Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("Having
undertaken to provide a free public education to all of its children, including its exceptional
children, the [state] may not deny any mentally retarded child access to a free public
program of education and training.").
134 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1974) (relying on a federal statute to
disallow a requirement of basic English language skills to participate in educational
programs), overruled on othergrounds by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
135 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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1972,136 language minorities in 1974,137 students with disabilities
in 1975,138 and homeless students in 1987.139
Building on these federal movements, state courts eventually
became involved in educational equality. Starting in the mid1970s, a few state courts declared education to be a fundamental
right under their respective constitutions and ordered reforms in
school finance structures that would direct more resources toward
poor students and districts.140 When desegregation slowed in the
late 1980s, the state movement gained even more momentum, as
numerous courts declared that students had a constitutional right
to some qualitative level of education, whether it be an adequate, a
sound basic, a thorough, or a high quality education.141 In the
span of just three decades, public education went from a system
that was free to treat children as it saw fit, including entirely
excluding some students from opportunities without any
legitimate reason, to one constitutionally and statutorily ordered
to expand opportunity and treat students fairly.
Yet, just like education's first two acts, this modern era of
While
educational civil rights was not entirely linear.
desegregation and various other movements were broadly
expanding rights, the courts and Congress were imposing doctrinal
limits along the way. As early as 1973, the Court took steps to
limit desegregation, holding that school districts were obligated to
Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000).
13 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1450 (2006).
13 McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11374 (2006)).
140 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (holding that education is a
fundamental interest and subjecting classifications based on district wealth to strict
scrutiny); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (finding that an equal education
opportunity was a state constitutional mandate best measured by a discrepancy in dollar
input per pupil).
141 See, e.g., Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 733 (Idaho
1993) (construing the Idaho constitution to impose a duty on the legislature to provide a
"general, uniform and thorough" system of education); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
790 S.W.2d 186, 200 (Ky. 1989) (finding a state constitutional duty to provide an "efficient"
system of education); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552-54
(Mass. 1993) (finding that the state was violating its state constitutional duty by depriving
many students in poor communities of an adequate education); Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 664 (N.Y. 1995) (interpreting New York's constitutional right
to a "sound basic education").
136
137
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remedy only the segregation that they intentionally created or
maintained.142 One year later, the Court held that remedies for
intentional discrimination must be limited to the confines of the
individual school districts that caused the segregation.143 The
effect of these holdings was to exempt many school districts from
desegregating at all, particularly many northern and suburban
districts.144 Nearly two decades later, the Court treated the
inevitable demographic shifts that occur over time as severing the
tie between current segregation and prior acts of intentional
segregation.145 This approach offered most districts a basis for
terminating their desegregation efforts and the rest an excuse for
failing to desegregate in the first instance.146
Disability, English Language Learner, and school finance cases
likewise experienced setbacks shortly after or concurrent with
rights expansion. For instance, while delivering individualized
special education programs is now standard practice in most
modern schools and while courts routinely vindicate the violation
of requisite procedural protections, structural aspects of education
continue to produce systemic special education failures,147
particularly those relating to the intersection of disability with
race, discipline, and poverty.148 Congress has made some attempt
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213-14 (1973).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) ('lIlt must first be shown that there
has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant
segregative effect in another district.... [W]ithout an interdistrict violation and
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.").
142
143

144 See GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 10-16 (1996) (comparing Brown's effect in the

South to the limiting effects of Milliken on the North).
145 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1992).
146 See Parker, School Desegregation,supra note 8, at 1209 (indicating that demographic
changes provide larger schools with "plausible excuses" for segregation).
147 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary's Now-Limited Role in Special
Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN

EDUCATION 121 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009) (discussing the successes
and shortcomings of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as applied to
education).
148 See, e.g., Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA- Shifting Educational Paradigms to
Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2005) (discussing
the issues of racial discrimination in special education and indicating that AfricanAmerican students are so disproportionately identified as disabled under the IDEA "that
the Department of Education considers it a 'national problem' and experts proclaim it a

HeinOnline -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 584 2011-2012

2012]

EDUCATION'S ELUSIVE FUTURE

585

to address certain systemic failures, such as racial bias in
disability identification, but has yet to produce a solution.
Moreover, these attempts are counterbalanced by congressional
efforts to afford administrators more flexibility in providing special
education services1 49 and to alleviate the perceived undue burdens
that special education purportedly places on schools. 50
The nonlinear progress for English Language Learners and
school finance claims is even more obvious. For English Language
Learners, the principle that students have affirmative rights to
language services has expanded and is now firmly in place. 51
Likewise, school finance litigation has resulted in the explicit
recognition of constitutional rights to equal and/or quality
educational opportunities for all students. 5 2 But, in both
movements, the implementation of these established rights has
been uneven and sometimes halted by courts' inquiries into
evidentiary questions of whether educational programs and
policies or external factors are the cause of students' low
achievement.153 In the absence of conclusive evidence attributing
'crisis' "); Katherine Twomey, Note, The Right to Education in Juvenile Detention Under
State Constitutions, 94 VA. L. REV. 765, 776-77 (2008) (discussing the limits of class action
special education litigation to address problems with juvenile delinquents). But see Larry
P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that federal special education law was
violated where the district relied primarily on an intelligence quotient (IQ) test that
disproportionately disadvantaged minority students rather than using the statutorily
mandated evaluation tools).
14 Congress has attempted to curtail the procedural requirements of the Act, particularly
those related to paperwork. 20 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006) (permitting the Secretary of Education
to grant waivers to reduce the paperwork and procedural obligations of schools).
150See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How Exceptional Children in
Out-of-Home Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 81, 93 (2000)
("[C]ompliance with special education mandates is often focused on meeting procedural
requirements as opposed to outcome goals."); Ashley Oliver, Survey, Should Special
Education Have a Price Tag? A New Reasonableness Standardfor Cost, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
763, 763 (2006) (discussing the high cost of special education).
151See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (obligating school districts "to take appropriateaction
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its
instructional programs." (emphasis added)).
152 See Rebell, supra note 53, at 1500-05 (discussing victories in adequacy and equity
litigation).
15s See, e.g., Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 307
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002) (indicating that plaintiffs could not establish that an English-only
educational program was ineffective until after it was implemented and results were
available to evaluate); Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 714-15
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responsibility to the state, courts have refused to afford
disadvantaged students remedies. 54
In summary, the overall story of education's third act is one of
exponentially expanding educational rights. This expansion,
however, was not uncompromising, but rather was tempered early
in most movements. More recently, this tempering has taken the
shape of what appears to be a practical repudiation of rights,
particularly in regard to race. The current inability to press
various educational rights might lead many to despair that
educational rights are on the terminal wane. And with this
despair comes the inability to conceptualize a future that entails
racially and socioeconomically integrated schools, fully and
adequately funded schools, and schools where all children are
achieving at high levels or, at least, have the opportunity to do so.
In this respect, the recent past can serve to define the entire
future.
Yet a fuller appreciation of the two acts that preceded the
modern era, as well as the nuance of the modern era, suggests the
recent past is but the falling action in education's third act that,
while not an overwhelming success, moved education dramatically
forward. Just as political events and Plessy cut short the gains of
Reconstruction and the NAACP cut deep into the underpinning of
separate but equal prior to Brown, recent retractions in
educational rights are an unfortunate part of what may be a
natural cycle. The important point is that the overall cycle is one
of continual improvement of education that arises out of a natural
tug of war.

(N.D. Cal. 1989) (refusing to attribute student failure to school-level policies and practices);
Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982) (noting that courts are
ill-suited to determine whether a causal connection exists between funding and student
outcomes and refusing to "venture into the realm of social policy"); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285
S.E.2d 156, 160 (Ga. 1981) (finding insufficient evidence to support a causal connection
between state funding and student achievement); Haas, supra note 10, at 361-62 (stating
that courts have "placed a burden upon plaintiff [English Language Learners] to show that
an English language assistance program was 'inappropriate' by demonstrating that a school
district's language program was completely unsupportable under all circumstances.").
154 See supra note 153.
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IV. THE CATALYST FOR A NEW ERA?

Unfortunately, although a contextualization of the past may be
sufficient to dissuade the notion that the end is near or has
already come, it cannot tell us what to expect in the future. 55 At
most, it offers a perspective with which to view current
circumstances and a guide to the realm of possibilities as we move
forward. With that caveat firmly in mind, this Essay contends
that our educational system is currently in a transitional phase.
Both the expansion and retraction of rights are largely complete.
The past decade has shown neither a sign of a new rights
paradigm,156 nor any indication that a further serious retraction of
existing rights is necessary to placate oppositional forces. In
effect, the rights movement of the modern era has stabilized. 57
What comes next is not certain, but this stabilization, while
discouraging for advocates, is not equivalent to reaching a low
point or a sign of the end. To the.contrary, the stabilization of
rights makes transition to a fourth era of expansion possible. 58
Moreover, with the past era having created a vast foundation of
rights and norms,159 the next era could move us close to the
meaningful and lasting equal educational opportunity that others
have struggled so long to achieve.
This optimism, to some, might seem wishful and based on little
more than intuition. Yet, one could say the same, or even worse, of
the concession of defeat or acceptance of stagnation. Just one year
after the Court decided Brown and long before any schools were
155 Although social scientists and historians are making strides in the systematic analysis of
the past as a predictor of the future, this Essay obviously comes nowhere near their
sophisticated analysis. Moreover, even as to that analysis, comparative historians
See, e.g., James Mahoney & Dietrich
acknowledge its limitations and problems.
Rueschemeyer, ComparativeHistoricalAnalysis: Achievements and Agendas, in COMPARATIVE
HISTORICAL

ANALYSIS IN THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES 3, 5

(James Mahoney

& Dietrich

Rueschemeyer eds., 2003) (questioning the scope of issues for which this is relevant).
156 The most recent rights paradigm appears to be that of the right to a quality education.
For a general discussion of the paradigm, see Rebell, supra note 53, at 1500-05.
157 See supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text (demonstrating that even the school
finance reform paradigm has shown signs of retraction).
18 See Rebell, supra note 53, at 1500 (describing how education finance challenges did not
begin to accelerate until the "Supreme Court's active involvement with desegregation
remedies [began] to lag").
159 See supra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
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actually desegregated or the civil rights movement had gained
serious traction, Woodward wrote:
The new Southern system [of Jim Crow] was regarded
as the 'final settlement,' the 'return to sanity,' the
Few stopped to reflect that
'permanent system.'
previous systems had also been regarded as final,
sane, and permanent by their supporters. The illusion
of permanency was encouraged by the complacency of
a long-critical North, the propaganda of reconciliation,
and the resigned compliance of the Negro. The illusion
was strengthened further by the passage of several
decades during which change was averted or
minimized. Year after year spokesmen of the region
assured themselves and the world at large that the
South had taken its stand, that its position was
immovable, that alteration was unthinkable, come
what might. 160
Although he could not forecast the details of what would follow,
Woodward was historically astute enough to write that the current
system of Jim Crow was "now crumbling before our eyes." 161 Of
course, as discussed above, an enormous expansion of rights would
follow just a few years after he wrote these passages.162
This comparison, however, is not to suggest that a bright fourth
era in education's saga is inevitable.163 The key to the fourth era is
to substantively conceive it. Without a conceptual framework
capable of animating the next era, a period of transition somewhat
susceptible to regression (at least as a matter of perspective) is
likely to persist. And unfortunately, the current policies vying for
the future of education offer no signs of capitalizing on current
circumstances and reopening the expansion of educational rights
and opportunities. On the one hand, the robust history behind us

1e0 WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 7-8.
161 Id. at 5.

See supra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
See KuNKNER & SUTH, supra note 17, at 8 ("[Although racial progress has not been
either inevitable or irreversible in America, it has been in significant ways cumulative.").
162

163
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offers a solid foundation to build upon.'" On the other, the
current set of leading policies are either failing to move that
history forward or appear deadset on abandoning that history to
pursue an uncharted course.165
The most forgiving appraisal of current policies is that they are
collectively floundering and their proponents lack the perspective
to recognize their likely futility. Among the competing reform
ideologies are a continuation of traditional civil rights remedies,
high stakes testing, increased funding, and school choice-whether
it be through charter schools, vouchers, or privatization.166
A. TRADITIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES

Regardless of the intrinsic merit or value, traditional civil
rights remedies and claims such as desegregation are, in most
instances, nonstarters in the policy and legal world.'67 New
mandatory desegregation remedies have been largely unrealistic
for some time given current doctrine,168 and voluntary
desegregation efforts, while important, are too random and meek
to produce widespread progress.169 Likewise, as a practical
matter, federal policy has long since abandoned the financial
incentives and legal mandates it could have adopted to give
diversity and desegregation a viable chance. 70

See supranotes 19-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
166 See, e.g., Garda, supra note 11, at 22-41 (describing various reform movements,
including standards-based accountability, school choice, and finance litigation).
167 See id. at 47 (stating that integration has been deserted because "integration was
improperly viewed as a failure").
16 See NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1342 n.2, 1367
(M.D. Ga. 2004) (indicating that the case before the court "may be the only pending school
desegregation case in the country in which an initial determination of liability has not yet
been made" and subsequently rejecting the claim).
169 See Derek W. Black, The UncertainFuture of School Desegregationand the Importance
of Goodwill, Good Sense, and a Misguided Decision, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 947, 953-56 (2008)
(discussing "meek" efforts at desegregation).
170 For a discussion of policies that could invigorate integration and that the federal
government has yet to undertake, see Le, supra note 37, at 768-85 ("[Tihe current
administration should actively seek to develop regulations, legislative revisions, and policy
positions that create positive, integration-encouraging activities, within the limits of the
law.').
164
165
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The fact that these trends could theoretically reverse with the
mere change in composition of the Supreme Court or a renewal
commitment from the Executive Branch is tantalizing for civil
rights groups. 17 1 In addition, these groups have long histories
devoted to protecting these past paradigms. 172 Yet, the sad truth
is that conventional wisdom-albeit flawed-has long since
concluded that desegregation was a failed experiment. 173 As such,
more of the same in terms of civil rights advocacy only serves to
doom the arguments to irrelevancy and potential extinction. In all
fairness, the concept of diversity as a positive educational benefit
for all presents a new paradigm. But, thus far, advocates have
failed to develop a systematic framework through which to
implement it,174 and opponents have cast it as a guise to justify
otherwise constitutionally prohibited action.175
For a time, school finance appeared ready to replace or continue
the spirit of Brown and serve as a major driver of equal
opportunity. During the 1990s and the first part of this century,
school finance advocates were routinely successful in securing
171 Cf Rebell, supra note 53, at 1539-42 (calling for a "colloquy" of "sustained commitment"
among the three branches of government to achieve "equal educational opportunity").
172 The NAACP Legal.Defense Fund, for instance, attained its prominence through its
efforts to desegregate schools. See KLUGER, supra note 106, at 253-84 (discussing the
NAACP's pre-Brown legal strategy to improve the quality of black education and its attacks
on segregated schooling and the NAACP's strategy in Brown to frontally attack the
principle of separate but equal in education). Over half a century later, its public image is
tied to those successes and it is the first one expected to speak to and defend issues relating
to school segregation. See, e.g., Brief of the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915), 2006 WL 2927075 at *1
(describing the NAACPs role in educational desegregation and diversity).
173 Compare JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 273 (2010)
(stating that desegregation is no longer fashionable), with Bradley W. Joondeph, Skepticism
and School Desegregation, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162-64 (1998) (responding to the
skepticism of desegregation, noting that "[i]n many respects, school desegregation has been
a remarkable policy success").
174 Current defenses of diversity are predicated on voluntary rather than mandatory or
systemic programs. See generally Lisa J. Holmes, Comment, After Grutter: Ensuring
Diversity in K-12 Schools, 52 UCLA L. REV. 563 (2004) (arguing for a framework that
upholds voluntary race-conscious student assignment policies in public schools).
17 See, e.g., Ward Connerly, It Is Time to End Race-Based "Affirmative Action," 1 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 56, 58 (2007) (asserting that the diversity rationale is an excuse
to discriminate).
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positive decisions from the courts.176 Those decisions held the
promise of finally securing the resources necessary to ensure that
disadvantaged students and districts receive the basic components
of a quality education. Over time, however, that promise has
begun to prove false. First, as noted above, courts have more
recently grown reluctant to issue sweeping orders or enforce them,
and the current financial crisis appears to have encouraged courts
to further withdraw.177 Second, while this litigation has made
some difference in some states, recent studies suggest extensive
inequities and inadequacies persist in most states.178 In fact,
notwithstanding court orders to the contrary, many states' finance
systems slip back, within a few years, into funding patterns
similar to those that existed prior to any litigation. 79 Third,
federal courts and policy makers have paid little, if any, attention
to school finance. Federal courts bowed out decades ago, 80 and
federal policy makers have intentionally shied away from
addressing the underlying problems for the past several
decades.' 8 ' In short, school finance reform currently offers no
signs of catalyzing a new era.
176 See Rebell, supra note 53, at 1500 (noting that inequities in school funding have been
challenged in more than forty states in the last few decades and plaintiffs have won in more
than 60% of them).
177 John Dayton, Anne Proffitt Dupre & Eric Houck, Commentary, Brother, Can You
Spare a Dime? Contemplating the Future of School Funding Litigationin Tough Economic
Times, 258 ED. LAW REP. 937, 954 (2010) ("[Clourts will face very difficult challenges in
attempting to bridge the growing gap between constitutional ideals and fiscal realities if the
General Assembly lacks public support and sufficient resources to fund remedies for school
funding inequities and inadequacies."); cf. Rebell, supra note 68 (positing that courts are
unlikely to grant jurisdiction or enforce existing claims in times of economic downturn).
178 See Marguerite Roza, How Districts Shortchange Low-Income and Minority Students,
in FUNDING GAPS 2006, at 9, 9-12 (Educ. Trust ed., 2006), http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtr
ust.org/files/publications/ffles/FundingGap2006.pdf (showing that districts direct money to
schools with less need); Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, How States Shortchange the Districts
That Need the Most Help, in FUNDING GAPS 2006, supra, at 5, 5-6 (determining that highminority districts receive less state and local money).
179See generally Christopher Berry, The Impact of School Finance Judgments on State
Fiscal Policy, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS, supra note 54, at 213 (discussing the results of
adequacy cases).
180See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973) (noting that it is
the role of state legislatures, not courts, to reform the systems of state taxation and
education).
181 See Derek W. Black, The CongressionalFailure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the
Elementary and Secondary EducationAct, 90 B.U. L. REv. 313, 314-15 (2010) (discussing the
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School finance may, in some respects, have simply fallen victim
to a continual re-waging of old battles. Definite battle lines in
school finance were originally set as a war over money and the
inequity between school districts. 82 Money alone, however, fails to
captivate or transform student experiences of its own accord. 83
Rather, money requires some pedagogical or policy end through
which to be funneled. While some important school finance cases
have focused on access to pre-kindergarten opportunities and other
To capture
programmatic services,184 much of it has not.
become a
have
to
would
finance
education's fourth act, school
battle over something other than just money, such as teachers,
pre-kindergarten, reading programs, or longer school years. In
fact, school finance litigation need not be "finance" litigation at all
but, rather, litigation over constitutional equity and adequacy and
the issues that money cannot remedy, such as socio-economic and
racial isolation. 85
Thus far, the great disappointment of school finance litigation
has been its failure to seriously challenge the social and racial
structures within which schools operate. 86 On its current course,
minimal role that federal law plays in ensuring resource equity between schools). The recent
creation of a commission to study inequity offers a glimmer of hope that the federal
government's position might change in the future. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., U.S.
Secretary of Education Appoints Members of Equity and Excellence Commission (Feb. 17,
2011), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releaseslus-secretary-education-appoints-me
mbers-equity-and-excellence-commission (announcing a new commission established to assess
the impact of school finance on opportunities and to give recommendations for improving
school finance to maximize equity).
182 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 15-16 ("Despite these recent increases, substantial
interdistrict disparities in school expenditures ... in San Antonio and in varying degrees
throughout the State still exist. And it was these disparities, largely attributable to
differences in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the
District Court to conclude that Texas'[s] dual system of public school financing violated the
Equal Protection Clause." (footnote omitted)).
183 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 404 (N.J. 1990) (noting that research is clear
"that money alone has not worked").
.184 See, e.g., Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 391-95 (N.C. 2004)
(reviewing a lower court's order of pre-kindergarten services).
185 James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
529, 533-35 (1999) (writing that "school 'finance' litigation need not be limited to funding"
and that the affirmative right to education embodied in such litigation could be used to
foster integration remedies).
188 Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), is the only state court opinion to marry
the issues of school finance with segregation.
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the task of school finance has too often devolved to making
separate schools equal-a premise that proved false during the
Plessy era.187 Of course, schools are no longer segregated by law
and high minority schools are in desperate need of resources to
mitigate the circumstances in which they find themselves. But
neither money alone nor educational, policy that ignores
segregation is well-positioned to produce equal opportunity in the
future.
B. NEW REFORM MOVEMENTS

The two leading national policies of the day-testing and
charter schools-may suffer from the opposite problems of
desegregation and school finance: they are not sufficiently
grounded in lessons from the past. This approach can make for
drama and popular appeal. But if one accepts that the past offers
important lessons, ungrounded policy does not make for good
policy. Thus, neither testing nor charter school policy is likely to
prompt a new progressive era.
Testing and accountability rose to national prominence in 2002
when the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) 88 was enacted with
bipartisan support.189 Although the notion of standardized testing
was not new,o90 the sanctions attached to low test scores largely
were, as was the role of the federal government as a dominant
driver of local educational policy.191
The popular narrative
187 See Garda, supra note 11, at 88-89 ("It is believed that true equality can be achieved
under a 'separate but equal' route that failed before, because outcome equality and school
choice now supplement input equality. But equality in separate schools will prove as
illusory both today and in the future as it did under Plessy.").
18 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
189 See Lizette Alvarez, House Votes for New Testing to Hold Schools Accountable, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2001, at Al (discussing the significant bipartisan support for NCLB in the
House).
190 See William Celis, Administration Offers Plan for Better Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1993, at A20 (reporting a plan of the first Clinton Administration to improve public schools
using, among other methods, national tests); cf. Bill Zlatos, Testing: Scores That Don't Add
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at 28 (questioning the effectiveness of standardized testing
when poor results are so easy to avoid).
191See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, Edgy About Exams, Schools Cut the Summer Short, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at 1 (noting that many Florida districts shortened the summer break
due to worry about federal sanctions for low test scores).
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surrounding NCLB was that testing and accountability for
educational standards, in and of themselves, would lead to
educational improvement and close achievement gapS.19 2 The
testing was not promoted as achieving any particular substantive
end. Rather, schools were free to adopt whatever policies,
curricula, pedagogy, and tests they wanted' 93-so long as they did,
in fact, test students and hold schools accountable for the
results.194 In fact, so much was left to states' discretion that they
were essentially free to manipulate tests and cut-off scores to
produce the statistical outcomes that NCLB sought, without doing
anything to improve the substance of what students learned.195
Regardless, by most accounts, NCLB has been a failure.196 It
has not produced a noticeable gain in student achievement,'97 and
192 See Excerpt from Bush Statement Announcing Start of His Education Initiative, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A14 (stating overall goals of NCLB); Nicholas Lemann, Letter

From Washington, Testing Limits: Can the President'sEducation Crusade Survive Beltway
Politics?,NEW YORKER, July 2, 2001, at 28-34 (detailing the crusades-like feel of President
Bush's education plan and how it conflicted with political realities).
193 See James E. Ryan, Standards,Testing, and School FinanceLitigation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1223, 1247-48 (2008) (pointing out that this lack of standards allows states to adopt lower
standards to remain in compliance).
194 See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006) (requiring states to set standards, test students on them,
and hold schools accountable).
195 See Ryan, supra note 193, at 1248-49 (offering evidence that at least twelve states
lowered the score needed to be proficient on state tests and noting discrepancies of state
results when compared to National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) results).
196 See, e.g., Philip T.K. Daniel & Maurice R. Dyson, Bringing Every Child Forward:
Lessons Learned Under No Child Left Behind & a Roadmap for Obama's Educational
Reform, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 63, 66-67 (2009) (arguing that negative shifts in

curriculum and continued racial inequalities are attributable to NCLB); Regina Ramsey
James, How to Mend a Broken Act: RecapturingThose Left Behind by No Child Left Behind,
45 GONZ. L. REV. 683, 683-84 (2010) (indicating NCLB has failed); Craig Livermore &
Michael Lewchuk, Centralized Standards and Decentralized Competition: Suggested
Revisions for No Child Left Behind to Create Greater EducationalResponsiveness Toward
Disempowered Minority Groups, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 435 (2009) ("[Sltudies

suggest that few failing schools are actually engaged in meaningful restructuring despite
the mandate. State assessment standards are significantly politically contingent on inputs
from various special interests which are not necessarily aligned with the interests of
student performance, and the NCLB restructuring provisions are flexible to the point of
complete malleability.").
197 See ANNA HABASH ROWAN, DARIA HALL & KATI HAYCOCK, EDUc. TRUST, GAUGING THE
GAPS: A DEEPER LOOK AT STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 2-3 (2010) (discussing trends on NAEP

test results). But see CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, STATE TEST SCORE TRENDS THROUGH 2007-08,
PART 1: IS THE EMPHASIS ON "PROFICIENCY" SHORTCHANGING HIGHER- AND LOWERACHIEVING STUDENTS? 1-2 (2009), http://www.cep-dc.org/cfcontent_file.cfm?Attachment=C
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thus, its system of sanctions is set to kick in. 98 In fact, in the
spring of 2011, the Secretary of Education projected that, in the
fall of 2011, NCLB would label 80% of the nation's schools as
failing.199 This posed two serious problems. First, the mandatory
sanctions and corrective action that these labels demand would be
so widespread and disruptive that any benefits one might hope to
make by sanctioning schools would most likely be offset by the
chaos sanctions would bring.200 Second, many of the schools that
NCLB would label as failing are not "bad" schools. 20 1 In fact, only
a small percentage would fairly reflect that characterization.
Recognizing as much, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan and
President Obama have agreed to waive noncompliance with
NCLB. 202 They would, however, only grant waivers based on an
interesting set of policy-based conditions. In exchange for waiving
the required proficiency levels on the tests, states must agree to
adopt a standardized curriculum called "Common Core
Standards," 203 which states themselves have been developing as an
attempt to systemize and nationalize what is taught across the
nation. 204 Further, in exchange for waiving teacher quality

hudowsky2Kober%5FSTSTO7%2DO8%5FP1%2DGeneralAchievementTrends%5FO61709%2
Epdf (finding gains in all areas studied as a result of NCLB).
198 See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring states to establish accountability
systems that sanction schools for failing to meet NCLB's goals); Sam Dillon, Most Public
Schools May Miss Targets, Education Secretary Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at A16
(stating that the Secretary of Education believed 80,000 of the nation's 100,000 public
schools could be labeled failing under NCLB).
199 Dillon, supra note 198.
200 See id. at A22 (noting that escalating sanctions for missing targets include layoffs and
shutdowns).
201 See id. at A16 ("Even many of the nation's best-run schools are likely to fall short of the
law's rapidly rising standardized testing targets. . . ").
202 See Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law: Waivers Offered to Sidestep a 100
Percent Proficiency Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A12 (detailing the decision to waive
compliance with the 100% proficiency deadline).
203 See Michele McNeil & Alyson Klein, States Cautious on Duncan's NCLB-Flexibility
Offer, EDUC. WK. (June 20, 2011), http://edweek.org (noting that the waiver and exchange
package was not yet finalized, but adoption of the common core standards was likely).
204 See About the Standards,COMMON CORE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestand
ards.org/about-the-standards (last visited Dec. 14, 2011) (providing an overview of the
initiative).
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targets, states must agree to adopt measures of teacher
performance, which will presumably be based on test scores. 205
In effect, the Obama Administration is attempting to
symbolically break from NCLB by waiving its specific
requirements while, at the same time, retaining NCLB's focus on
curricular standards and tests through conditional waivers that
slightly modify schools' federal obligations. The primary difference
between NCLB's original mandates and the current waivers is
that the waivers shift accountability for the test results from
schools and students to teachers. This shift, however, is unlikely
to alleviate the problems and concerns that drove us to this point.
Rather, it may ultimately be "damage control" that pushes failed
policies further down the road.
The most significant recent trend in educational policy,
however, may have nothing to do with NCLB. Educational
programs that are largely exempt from the purportedly onerous
aspects of state, local, and federal bureaucracies are consistently
at the center of policy reforms. Charter schools, in particular,
have gained unparalleled political traction in the past few years. 206
The idea of charter schools has captivated the public's imagination
through the highly publicized Harlem Children's Zone 207 and films
such as Waiting for Superman208 and The Lottery,209 which paint a
dreary picture of public schools and a fanciful one of charters. 210
The Obama Administration is no exception, placing charter schools
at the center of its policy agenda from the outset. President
Obama appointed an avid proponent of charters, Arne Duncan, as
the Secretary of Education. 211 And in March 2010, the U.S.
205 See McNeil & Klein, supra note 203 (quoting Indiana Superintendent of Public
Instruction as a fan of these measures).
206 See Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Erica Frankenberg, Does Law Influence Charter
School Diversity? An Analysis of Federal and State Legislation, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 321,
323 (2011) (describing growth of charter schools and federal financial incentives for
increasing the number of charter schools).
207 See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed, The Harlem Miracle, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A31
(touting the positive results of the Harlem Children's Zone schools).
208 WAITING FOR SUPERMAN (Electric Kinney Films 2010).
209 THE LOTTERY (Great Curve Films 2010).
210 Cf. Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Grading School Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2010, at A23
(describing public school bureaucracy as "manipulative" and "simplistic").
211 See, e.g., Editorial, Promises and Facts on Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010,
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Department of Education released A Blueprint for Reform: The
Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
which included charter schools as a central component. 212
Even more telling is the fact that reauthorizing the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act has been on standstill for the past
two years, 213 relegating the once dominant federal policy to an
afterthought, while the President's commitment to charter schools
moved forward on an independent legislative track. Through
competitive grant programs that give advantages and special
consideration to states that enact, among other policies, procharter legislation, the Obama Administration has greatly
expanded the possibilities for charter schools. 214 North Carolina,
for instance, had maintained a strict cap on the number of charter
schools in the state, but in response to competitive grants, the
state lifted that cap and is now confronting a potential explosion of
charters. 215 Other states have made analogous changes. 216
Now that Republicans control the U.S. House of
Representatives, 2 17 charter schools are poised to receive more
support. Some within the Democratic Party have expressed

at A16 (indicating Secretary Duncan's desire to turn failing schools into charters).
212

See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6 (2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/po
licy/elsec/legfblueprintlblueprint.pdf (supporting expansion of school choice).
213 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration Proceeds with Reform of
No Child Left Behind Following Congressional Inaction (Aug. 8, 2011), available at http://
www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-proceeds-reform-no-child-left-behin
d-following-congressiona (explaining that the proposal had been in the House for sixteen
months as of August 2011).
214 See Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, supra note 206, at 338-40 (noting that Obama's
"Race to the Top" program provides billions of dollars to expand charter schools); Sam
Dillon, Dangling$4.3 Billion, Obama Pushes States to Shift on Education, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 2009, at Al (citing Secretary Duncan's statement that states without charter schools are
unlikely to receive an award from Race to the Top).
215 See Rob Christensen, Perdue Signs Law Lifting Cap on Charter Schools, NEWS &
OBSERVER N.C., June 17, 2011, http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/06/17/1281607/perdue-si

gns-law-lifting-cap-on.html (noting near unanimous passage of bill).
216 See, e.g., Lori Higgins, Group Ups Michigan to 10th in Charter School Law Rankings,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 18, 2012, available at http://www.freep.com/article/20120118/N
(indicating that
EWSO6/120118030/Group-ups-Michigan-10th-charter-school-law-rankings
Michigan's governor is progressively easing the cap on the charter schools that the state's
public universities can authorize).
217 Jeff Zeleny, Reid Is Re-Elected and Keeps Leader's Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at Al.
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reservations or hostility toward charter schools, 218 but they appear
too small in number to impede charter school policy. Charter
schools seem to be a primary point of agreement between the
President and Republicans. 219 The President's position on charter
schools has been clear and, upon taking control of the U.S. House
of Representatives in the 112th Congress, Republicans quickly
moved a bill through committee that would significantly expand
federal funding and support for charters. 220
Both charter schools and high-stakes testing policy suffer from
the fatal flaw of ahistorical positions. In particular, they largely
ignore the problems that the two dominant movements prior to
them have devoted their entire existence to addressing:
segregation and resource inequality. For instance, NCLB-to the
delight of some civil rights advocates-has provided further
evidence of the perversity of racial and socio-economic segregation
and inequality. The data results produced under the Act show
that those schools enrolling the highest percentages of poor and
minority students have consistently performed far lower than
other schools on standardized tests and secured far fewer highly
qualified teachers. 221 In this respect, NCLB highlights the
218 See, e.g., Richard Pdrez-Pefia, ChristieCalls for More Cuts and Big Changes to Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A19 (indicating charter school expansion in New Jersey "will
be a tough sell in a Legislature controlled by Democrats"). It is worth noting that while
many Democrats have raised questions about charter schools and have political allegiances
opposed to charter schools, the overall tenor of the party and its leadership is predisposed
toward charter schools. See, e.g., Building on What Works at Charter Schools: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 2-3 (2009) (statement of Rep. George
Miller, Chairman) (lauding the successes of certain charter schools); David Brooks, Op-Ed.,
An Innovation Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A37 (indicating that President Obama,
Republicans, and Democrats agree on the need to encourage charter school innovation).
219 See Julie Pace, Obama, in Florida,Makes Nice with Republicans, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
4, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/4/obama-jeb-bush-teaming-florid
a-school/2page-all (reporting that former Republican Governor of Florida Jeb Bush and
President Obama agree on education policies, including increasing charter schools).
220 Empowering Parents Through Quality Charter Schools Act, H.R. 2218, 112th Congress
(2011) (including goals of the bill and an allocation of funds to support charters); see also
Kate Andersen Brower, Obama Headed for Fight Over School Spending and Laws,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2011), http://Bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-24/duncan-obama-headed-f
or-fight-in-congress-on-education-policy-funding.html (noting that President Obama has
"adopted such traditionally Republican principles as charter schools").
221 See Renee v. Duncan, 623 F.3d 787, 797 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing statistics showing
greater percentages of intern faculty (i.e., teachers lacking "full state certification") at
schools attended by predominately low-income and minority students); SARAH ALMY &

HeinOnline -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 598 2011-2012

2012]

EDUCATION'S ELUSIVE FUTURE

599

problem of segregation: The compounding negative effects of
concentrated poverty depress academic achievement and make
securing one of education's most vital resources-good teachers-a
staggering feat. 22 2 Yet, inexplicably, NCLB does almost nothing to
address the problem it reveals. 223 Rather, it condemns the
existence of achievement and teacher quality gaps while
sanctioning the segregation and funding inequities that create the
gaps. 224
To its credit, NCLB currently includes a measure whereby
students assigned to failing schools have the option to transfer to
another school. 225 The measure, however, has proven more
symbolic than practically meaningful. First, evidence shows
systemic failures on the part of school districts to notify and afford
parents these rights. 226 Second, and more importantly, the
transfer option exists as a matter of right only within school
districts-not between them. 227 Because low-performing schools
are typically situated within low-performing districts, the right of
transfer would typically be pointless to exercise-as it would only
land a student in another low-performing school. 228 The obvious
CHRISTINA THEOKAS, EDUC. TRUST, NOT PREPARED FOR CLASS: HIGH POVERTY SCHOOLS
CONTINUE TO HAVE FEWER IN-FIELD TEACHERS 2 (2010) (reporting that high-poverty
schools have a disproportionate number of inexperienced and out-of-field teachers); EDUC.
TRUST-WEST, ACCESS DENIED: 2009 API RANKINGS REVEAL UNEQUAL ACCESS TO
CALIFORNIA'S BEST SCHOOLS 1-2 (2010) (presenting analysis and graphical depiction of low
performance on high-stakes tests from high-need and minority-concentrated schools).
222 See Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation:All Things Are Not Equal,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 116 (2009) (commenting that quality teachers will not

consistently teach in "black schools").
223 See Black, supra note 181, at 314-15, 370-71 (discussing the minimal role that federal
law plays in ensuring resource equity between schools and proposing ways it could address
segregation).
224 Id.
at 314-15.
225 20 U.S.C. §6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006).
226 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF PLANNING, EVALUATION & POLICY DEv., POLICY AND
PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE No CHILD LEFIT BEHIND
ACT: VOLUME IV-TITLE I SCHOOL CHOICE AND SUPPLEMENTAL EDUCATIONAL SERVICES:
INTERIM REPORT, at xxiii (2008) ("[O]nly a small proportion of eligible students actually
participated in the choice options available to them").
-7
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2002) ("Mhe local educational agency shall ... provide all
students enrolled in the [failing] school with the option to transfer to another public school
served by the local educationalagency . . ." (emphasis added)).
228 See Craig R. Heeren, 'Together at the Table of Brotherhood" Voluntary Student

Assignment Plans and the Supreme Court, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 184-85 (2008)
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solution is to extend the right of transfer to neighboring
districts. 229 But recent reauthorization discussions have signaled
that the right of transfer might be eliminated altogether.230 In
short, the trajectory of federal policy is to further distance itself
from its already willfully negligent approach to segregation.
Given that NCLB accepts the existence of segregation, one
might expect that it would attempt to make separate equal, but
surprisingly, it did very little on that score as well. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (the
formal title of NCLB) placed relatively strict equity requirements
on schools and districts receiving federal funds. 231 During the
Reagan Administration, those requirements were eroded to the
point of practical irrelevance. 232 And although recent research
(noting that the transfer plan is ineffective in racially isolated failing districts).
229

See generally William L. Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation

and Equal Educational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751, 1755-62 (2003) (discussing
transfer rights and states' uses of them under NCLB). Interdistrict transfers, without
question, entail administrative and school finance complexities. Nonetheless, voluntary
interdistrict programs have proven successful in several jurisdictions, and they have done
so without federal support. See id. at 1760-61 (describing the experience of St. Louis,
Missouri, with interdistrict transfers); see also AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., CHARLES
HAMILTON INST. FOR RACE & JUSTICE, BOUNDARY CROSSING FOR DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND
ACHIEVEMENT: INTER-DISTRICT SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
2-3 (2009), available at http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/assets/documents/publicati
ons/WellsBoundaryCrossing.pdf (identifying eight different interdistrict programs). Given
that over 90% of school districts receive Elementary and Secondary Education Title I funds,
the federal government is in a position to mandate the transfers as a condition of the Act.

C. Joy Farmer, Note, The No Child Left Behind Act: Will It Produce a New Breed of School
Financing Litigation?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 443, 456 (2005) ("[N]ine out of ten
districts receive Title I funds."). Given the investiture of Title I in poor students, funds.are
at the governments disposal to make these transfers not only mandatory but also
attractive.
230 See MEREDITH P. RICHARDS, KoRI J. STROUB & JENNIFER JELLISON HOLME, CENTURY
FOUND., CAN NCLB CHOICE WORK? MODELING THE EFFECTS OF INTERDISTRICT CHOICE ON
STUDENT ACCESS TO HIGHER-PERFORMING SCHOOLS 3-5 (2011) (responding to suggestions
to jettison the transfer provision).
231 See 45 C.F.R. § 116.26 (1975) (requiring comparability at a 5% variance between Title I
and non-Title I schools); 45 C.F.R. § 116a.26 (1979) (requiring the same 5% comparability
between Title I and non-Title I schools).
232 See Phyllis McClure, The History of Educational Comparability in Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN

PUBLIC EDUCATION: How LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT FUNDING PRACTICES HURT
DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND WHAT FEDERAL POLICY CAN Do ABoUT IT 9, 21 (Ctr. for
Am. Progress ed., 2008), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/06/pdf/
comparability.pdf.
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highlighted the problem, NCLB did nothing directly to address
it.233 Rather than increasing and concentrating the investment in
poorer schools, Congress's investment through NCLB has been
relatively modest and spread far too thin.23 4 In addition, NCLB
contains no effective mechanism to assure that states and school
districts do not just offset the federal investment by reducing their
own. 235 By ignoring these problems, NCLB's sanctions for lowperforming schools amount to the practical equivalent of punishing
schools for being poor and segregated-the very things that they
have no means to change. 236 In this respect, NCLB's approach is
ahistorical and will collapse on itself rather than offer a segway to
a new era.
The charter school movement fairs only slightly better. The
movement seems to acknowledge that poverty and segregation
create serious problems. 237 Its response is to create a new vehicle
for delivering education in impoverished and segregated
neighborhoods. The problem is that the vehicle, albeit new,
continues to drive on the same road. Rather than attempting to
destroy the walls of poverty and segregation structures, charter
schools largely accept and work within them. While a precious few
exceptions exist, 238 integration has not been among the goals of
233 See Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, Op-Ed., Class Matters. Why Won't We Admit
It?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, at A23 ("No Child Left Behind required all schools to bring
all students to high levels of achievement but took no note of the challenges that
disadvantaged students face.").
234 See Black, supra note 181, at 340-43 (explaining that "over ninety percent of school
districts receive Title I funds" because the eligibility threshold is a "mere two percent"
poverty level in the district).
235 See id. at 352-53 (noting that the U.S. Department of Education, as a practical matter,
abandoned enforcement because enforcing a prohibition on supplanting funds was too
speculative and required detailed tracking of spending).
236 Ladd & Fiske, supra note 233.
237 See, e.g., History, HARLEM CHILDREN'S ZONE, http://www.hcz.orglabout-us/history (last
visited Dec. 15, 2011) (proclaiming that the purpose of the Harlem Children's Zone is "to
offer innovative, efficiently run programs that are aimed at doing nothing less than
breaking the cycle of generational poverty for the thousands of children and families it
serves"); Halley Potter, Equity and Diversity: The Next Challenge for Charter Schools,
TAKING NOTE: A CENTURY FoUND. GRP. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2011), http://takingnote.tcf.org/20
11/01/equity-and-diversity-the-next-challenge-for-charter-schools.html (describing the goals
of charter schools).
28 See, e.g., Dana Goldstein, Integration and the 'No Excuses' Charter School Movement,
WASH. POST: EzRA KLEIN'S WONKBLOG (June 2, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.
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For that matter, neither has funding
charter schools.239
equalization-as part of the point of charters is to neutralize
inequality through efficiency. 240 As a general matter, many
charter schools locate themselves in the heart of concentrated
poverty and racial isolation and struggle against the
overwhelming odds.241 Those that succeed appear to do so by
asking faculty, staff, and students to work harder and longer than
anyone else, and to do more with less. 2 4 2
Unfortunately, expecting schools to uniformly and consistently
do more with less may be fanciful thinking and begs the question
of whether the charter school ethic can be replicated on a large
scale. Even amongst the small cohort of existing charters, success
is not widespread. 243 At best, a few well-publicized ones are
achieving at high levels. 2 4 4 A recent study indicates that,
notwithstanding sometimes extraordinary efforts, most charter
schools are performing the same or worse than public schools. 245
Thus, the charter school model seems more apt to replicate a

com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/integration-and-the-no-excuses-charter-school-movement/2011/06/
02/AGmKLRHH..blog.html (discussing a charter school board member's support of diversity
and the diverse Rhode Island charter school Blackstone Valley Prep).
239 See Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, supra note 206, at 323 ("Charter schools were not
developed with specific goals for mitigating ongoing patterns of public school segregation,
though some voices in the movement suggested that their ability to transcend school
boundary lines might encourage diversity.").
240 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2080(a) (2009) (finding that charter schools can provide highquality education with efficiency).
241 See Frankenberg,
Siegel-Hawley & Wang, supra note 18, at 4 ("Charter
schools . .. tend to be located in urban areas. As a result, charter school enrollment
patterns display high levels of minority segregation, trends that are particularly severe for
black students.").
242 See, e.g., Why CharterSchools?, N.Y. CITY CHARTER SCH. CTR., http://www.nyccharters
chools.org/learnlabout-charter-schools/why-charter-schools (last visited Dec. 15, 2011)
(asserting that New York charter schools "do more with less"); supra note 240.
242

CENTURY FOUND.,

CHARTER SCHOOLS THAT WORK:

ECONOMICALLY INTEGRATED

SCHOOLS WITH TEACHER VOICE 4 (Oct. 2010) ("[C]laims of widespread charter school success
do not hold up to scrutiny, and, indeed, the general performance of charter schools
nationally has been largely disappointing.").
244 Recent studies even question the success and inferences to be drawn in the successful
charters. See, e.g., id. at 4-8.
24s Id.; see also RYAN, supra note 173, at 221 (finding no real evidence that charter schools
produce consistent academic gains); Diane Ravitch, A New Agenda for School Reform,
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2010, at A17 ("Charter schools have been compared to regular public
schools on the [NAEP] in 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009, and have never outperformed them.").
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system of winners and losers, with most students simply consigned
to low-performing charter schools instead of public schools, than it
is to resolve the problems of segregated and unequal educational
opportunities. Charter schools, through sheer will, might be able
to "save" more students than the current system, but the number
will still be proportionally small.
The limited success of charter schools strongly suggests that
acknowledging, without attacking, the problems of segregation and
inequality is not enough to transform well-intentioned policy into
the engine of equality. In fact, nothing in our history supports the
notion that poverty and segregation can be resolved by accepting
them. The most significant educational gains in our history came
when we attacked segregation. 246 This is not to say that charters
are per se bad or incapable of integrating or equalizing schools.
Rather, what the foregoing implicitly highlights, but policy makers
so rarely notice, is that charter schools are, in essence, contentneutral.
Charter schools do not mandate or require that schools do
anything in particular. 247 If flexibility is academic policy, then
charter schools are in that respect policy; but beyond that, they are
merely a vehicle for other open-ended policies. Charter schools
could be used to integrate schools just as easily as they could be
used to segregate them or make them more unequal. Likewise,
they can be-and are-used to offer longer school days, longer
school years, and stronger curricula. But they can also offer poor
curricula, staffs, or faculties. Worst of all, charter schools can be
used to intentionally subvert good policies. For instance, now that
North Carolina has capitulated to federal incentives for more
charter schools, one of the greatest fears is that white and middleincome parents who do not want to be subject to voluntary
desegregation plans will simply open their own racially isolated

246 See generally Roslyn Arlin Mickelson & Martha Bottia, Integrated Education and
Mathematics Outcomes: A Synthesis of Social Science Research, 88 N.C. L. REV. 993, 102642 (2010) (synthesizing the literature on the academic gains of integration and finding that
"[o]f the fifty-nine studies, forty-four reported statistically significant effects of racial
composition on outcomes").
247 See Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, supra note 206, at 323 ("[Charter schools] are not
subject to traditional regulations.").
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charter schools. 248 In short, charter schools are a faceless vehicle,
not a panacea or prescription. It is possible that they could be part
of the solution in a new era of educational civil rights, 24 9 but they
will not be an independent solution unless they respond more
directly to the underlying structural problems that inspire their
existence.
V. CONCLUSION

The final pages of educational civil rights are far from written.
At this point, some fail to recognize that there are pages, not just
one page, to be written. And some fail to imagine that those final
pages will mark progress. Progress, of course, will not come
without a realistic strategy for achieving it and an unrelenting
commitment to it. But progress is more surely doomed by disbelief
than it is by less than perfect plans. As Professors Phillip
Klinkner and Rogers Smith emphasized in their comprehensive
analysis of the historical evolution of racial equity in the United
States, "[i]n the end, our .. . fate is something that we have
significant powers to choose and determine." 250 In this respect, the
immediate task for the future of educational civil rights is simply
to recognize that we stand at the brink of a new era and must
develop its theoretical and emotional catalysts. Unfortunately,
those catalysts are unlikely to be found in current policy and
advocacy.
The challenge that all current reform policies seem ill-equipped
to overcome is appreciating and responding to historical context
without falling victim to it. As much as one might like to start
afresh, it is both too easy and too simple to conclude that the
rights revolution of the past half century was a failure and, thus,
justifies an entirely new path. In particular, the articulated rights
248 A recent study revealed this may have already been occurring on a smaller scale prior
to the lifting of the cap. Robert Bifulco & Helen F. Ladd, School Choice, Racial Segregation,
and Test-Score Gaps: Evidence from North Carolina'sCharter School Program, 26 J. POL'Y

ANALYsIs & MGMT. 31, 34, 39-40 (2006).
249

See CENTURY FOUND., supra note 243, at 12 ("[It seems quite possible to reinvent

charter schools... ."); RYAN, supra note 173, at 288-90 (discussing how charter schools and

choice plans could be tools for integration).
250

KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 17, at 9.
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of integration and equality were never implemented without
abandon. 25 1 Courts, legislatures, and local authorities grew
despondent far too quickly and lost their nerve to stay the
course. 252 Knowing whether these movements could have achieved
their ultimate goals is impossible. But we do know that the rights
revolution made real gains. Desegregation improved the academic
achievement of minority students in elementary and secondary
higher
education
expanded
drastically
and
schools
opportunities. 253 Special education laws created an entirely new
reality in which public schools now enroll and provide some form of
individualized services to special needs students who would
The Equal
otherwise be denied opportunity altogether. 254
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 brought an end to the
unadulterated neglect of language minorities and resulted in
language programs that are now consistently available for
students who do not speak and read English fluently. 255 And since
the mid-1960s, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act has delivered supplemental funding each year to schools
serving disadvantaged students. 256 These gains make denying and
underestimating the impact of the modern rights movement a
mistake. Yet, harping on these gains as a basis for doing more of
the same is a mistake as well. As a matter of perspective, policy
makers and the public have largely lost their taste for integration
and substantially increasing funding. 257 Once written, flawed
See RYAN, supra note 173, at 60 (noting lack of will to change the situation).
See id. (indicating that post-Brown courts were merely acquiescing to middle-class
whites' desires).
253 See LLOYD, TIENDA & ZAJACOVA, supra note 24, at 2-3 (finding a doubling of the
minority enrollment across public education over the past fifty years).
254 See, e.g., McKinney-Vento Homeless Education Assistance Improvements Act of 2001,
42 U.S.C. H§11431-11432 (2006).
251
252

255 See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc., THE BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE TITLE III STATE FORmuLA GRANT PROGRAM: SCHOOL YEARS 2004-06, at vii (2008)

(indicating that in recent years "[c]lose to 85 percent of identified LEP students are
participating in Title III-funded programs").
256 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6333 (2006) (providing Title I funding for schools serving
economically disadvantaged students based on states' per-pupil expenditures); § 6334
(guaranteeing small states a fixed amount of Title I funds regardless of need); § 6335(c)(1)(B)
(providing Title I funds based on poverty concentration levels); §6335(c)(1)(C) (weighting
Title I funds based on the total number of children in a school district).
257 Cf. Rebell, supra note 68 (noting reduced education spending due to budget cuts).
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views of history tend to-be unflappable in the public domain. And
attempting to rewind the clock is a waste of time.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that we are not operating on a
blank slate. Efforts that abandon the frameworks and previously
hard-earned gains for something entirely new will flounder
against structural barriers, sometimes without even recognizing it.
Segregation and resource inequality are simply too fundamental to
educational outcomes to ignore or underplay. The crucial question
not yet addressed by this Essay, however, is what potential policy
might actually respond to segregation and inequality and appear
reasonable in light of modern realities. The goal of this Essay was
to diagnose the problem rather than prescribe the remedy. If the
diagnosis is correct, serious analysis of the remedy it demands is
worthy of its own symposium. But rather than conveniently end
on that note, I would emphasize that nascent ideas consistent with
Leading scholars and
this thesis are already circulating.
advocates have hypothesized how charter schools and other school
choice mechanisms could achieve integration in contexts that
previously would have been impossible,258 how diversity and other
forms of racial equity could be incorporated into the basic fabric of
state constitutional rights to education, 259 how federal funding
formulas could incentivize both funding equality and socioeconomic integration, 260 how current federal statutes could
258 See RYAN, supra note 173, at 287-90 (proposing fixes with charters and vouchers);
James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got There First,
93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1311 (2005) (discussing the equity-oriented voucher system of the
Johnson Administration); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice To Achieve
Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 795 (2006) (noting that NCLB's transfer provision
may aid desegregation).
259 Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integrationof
the Public Schools, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1334, 1359-65 (2004) (noting that "theories of
unequal or inadequate schools could . .. just as readily justify a remedy of an altered school
structure that would more completely improve the education of the plaintiff children" and
proposing that plaintiffs "bypass the usual focus on reallocating money in favor of
presenting evidence that economic integration was needed to guarantee that the education
of students in plaintiff districts met the state constitutional standard").
260 See Black, supra note 181, at 370-71 ("To encourage poverty deconcentration at the
school level, Title I [funding formulas should account for] the poverty concentration between
schools within a school district, applying the same principles that it does at the district
level. Title I should provide incentives for districts that deconcentrate poor students among
their schools and penalize those districts that take actions to concentrate poor students in
particular schools."); see also NAT'L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, ISSUE BRIEF 1: KEY
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incorporate affirmative rights of educational opportunities rather
than just prohibitions on intentional discrimination, 261 and how we
might build the movement to amend the Constitution. 262 None of
these ideas have yet gained traction and maybe none should. Yet,
"because ... Americans can and should choose to commit
themselves anew to overcoming our deepest and most enduring
national [failures], not because . .. they cannot or will not do so," 263
there is ever the more reason to continue and redouble our reform
efforts. And given the history of educational civil rights, it is safe
to say that the vindication of efforts of this sort will be part of the
future, not just our past, if we can find the resolve to believe.

PRINCIPLES FOR ESEA REAUTHORIZATION 2 (2011), available at http://www.prrac.orgpdf/
DiversityIssueBriefNol.pdf (positing benefits of Title I funds for underperforming schools).
261 See LAWYER COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW ET AL., FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING
ALL STUDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN THROUGH REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 2 (2010) (urging federal policy to treat the

"opportunity to learn as a civil right" and defining that opportunity to include "early
education for all students in all states; policies that will provide access to highly effective
teachers for all students. . .; and community schools that offer wraparound services and
strong, engaging instruction with adequate supports.").
262 See Liu, supra note 86, at 334-35 (concluding, based on historical analysis, that a
minimum level of education is a right of national citizenship and that Congress is obligated
to enforce it); Jeannie Oakes et al., GrassrootsOrganizing,Social Movements, and the Right
to High-Quality Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 339, 355-57 (2008) (proposing that a
social movement is needed to secure a fundamental right to a high-quality education).
263 KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 17, at 9 (emphasis added).
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